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Abstract
Sponsored search advertising is ascendant Jupiter Research reports expenditures rose 28% in
2007 to $8.9B and will continue to rise at a 15% CAGR, making it one of the major trends to
a¤ect the marketing landscape. Yet little, if any empirical research focuses upon search engine
marketing strategy by integrating the behavior of various agents in sponsored search advertising
(i.e., searchers, advertisers, and the search engine platform). The dynamic structural model we
propose serves as a foundation to explore these and other sponsored search advertising phenomena.
Fitting the model to a proprietary data set provided by an anonymous search engine, we conduct
several policy simulations to illustrate the benets of our approach. First, we explore how infor-
mation asymmetries between search engines and advertisers can be exploited to enhance platform
revenues. This has consequences for the pricing of market intelligence. Second, we assess the e¤ect
of allowing advertisers to bid not only on key words, but also by consumers searching histories and
demographics thereby creating a more targeted model of advertising. Third, we explore several
di¤erent auction pricing mechanisms and assess the role of each on engine and advertiser prots
and revenues. Finally, we consider the role of consumer search tools such as sorting on consumer
and advertiser behavior and engine revenues.
One key nding is that the estimated advertiser value for a click on its sponsored link averages
about 24 cents. Given the typical $22 retail price of the software products advertised on the
considered search engine, this implies a conversion rate (sales per click) of about 1.1%, well within
common estimates of 1-2% (gamedaily.com). Hence our approach appears to yield valid estimates
of advertiser click valuations. Another nding is that customers appear to be segmented by their
clicking frequency, with frequent clickers placing a greater emphasis on the position of the sponsored
advertising link. Estimation of the policy simulations is in progress.
Keywords: Sponsored Search Advertising, Two-sided Market, Dynamic Game, Structural Models,
Empirical IO, Customization, Auctions
1 Introduction
1.1 Sponsored Search Marketing
1.1.1 Growth in Sponsored Search
Sponsored search on sites such as Google, Yahoo, Sidestep, Kayak, Bookfinder, MSN, etc. is one
of the largest and fastest growing advertising channels. In the United States alone, 2007 annual
expenditures on sponsored search advertising increased 28% to $8.9B and the number of rms
using sponsored search advertising rose from 29% to 41%.1 Hence, the tactic is becoming a central
component of the promotional mix in many organizations. By contrast, overall 2007 advertising
spending across all channels in the United States is estimated to be $283.8B, an increase of only
0.7%.2
The growth of this new medium arise in part due to the increasing popularity of search engine
sites relative to other media among consumers. In April of 2008, American Internet users conducted
10.6B searches on the 5 leading search engines.3 By comparison, a top rated TV show such as
Desperate Housewives only has about 25M viewers (IRI, 2007); and the growing popularity of
DVR services o¤ered by TiVo and cable companies have and will further decrease the audience base
of traditional TV advertising. Moreover, Qiu et al. (2005) estimate that more than 13.6% of the
web tra¢ c is a¤ected by search engines. Since more and more consumers use the Internet for their
transactions (Ansari et al. (2008)), Internet search is an especially e¢ cient way to promote online
channels. Not only does search advertising have expanding reach, but it often targets consumers
who are actively seeking information related to the advertisersproducts. For example, a search of
sedanand automotive dealermight signal an active purchase state. As a result of these various
factors, Jupiter Research reports that 82% of advertisers were satised or extremely satised with
search marketing ROI and 65% planned to increase search spending in 2007.4
Given the increasing ubiquity of sponsored search advertising, the topic has seen increased at-
tention in marketing as of late (Ghose and Yang (2007); Rutz (2007); Rutz and Bucklin (2007);
Goldfarb and Tucker (2007)). Yet most empirical work on the topic remains focused on the ad-
vertiser. To date, empirical research on key word search has largely ignored the perspective of
the search engine. Given that the search engine interacts with advertisers to determine the price
of the advertising (and hence its e¢ cacy), our objective is to broaden this stream of research to
incorporate the role of the search engine and its users. This exercise enables us to determine the
role of search engine marketing strategy on the behavior of advertisers and consumers as well as
the attendant implications for search engine revenues.
1US Paid Search Forecast, 2007 to 2012, Jupiter Research, 2007.
2Insiders Report, 2007, McCann WorldGroup, Inc..
3April 2008 U.S. Search Engine Rankings, comScore, Inc. (http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?
press=2230).
4US Paid Search Forecast, 2007 to 2012, Jupiter Research, 2007.
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Our key contributions are as follows. From a theoretical perspective, we conceptualize and
develop an integrated model of web searcher, advertiser and search engine behavior. To our knowl-
edge, this is the rst empirical paper focusing on the marketing strategy of the search engine. From
a substantive point of view, our contribution is to o¤er concrete marketing policy recommendations
to the search engine including its i) pricing (for both the key words and the clickstream data it
collects), ii) key word auction design (such as the pricing mechanism and whether advertiser bid-
ding should be targeted by segment as well as key word), and iii) web page design (e.g., should
features like sort or lter be added or dropped). From a methodological view, we develop a dynamic
structural model of key word advertising. The dynamic aspect of the problem requires the use of
some recent innovations pertaining to the estimation of dynamic games in economics (e.g., Bajari
et al. (2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008)). We extend this work to be Bayesian in
implementation and apply it to wholly new context.
One notable nding is that advertisers in our application have an average value per click of $0.24.
Given the average price of software products advertised on this site is about $22, this implies these
advertisers expect about 1.1% (i.e., $0.24/$22) of clicks will lead to a purchase. This is consistent
with the industry average of 1-2% reported by GameDaily.com, suggesting good face validity for our
model. In addition, we nd considerable heterogeneity in consumer response to sponsored search
advertising. Frequent link clickers, who represent 10% of the population but 90% of the clicks tend
to be more sensitive to slot order in part because slot position can signal product quality. These
insights represent central inputs into our yet to be completed policy simulations alluded to above.
1.1.2 Sponsored Search Advertising
The Internet contains an estimated 155 million sites and Internet search engines wade through this
information to return relevant results in response to userssearch queries.5 These organicsearch
results are often displayed as a list of links sorted by their relevance to the search query (Bradlow and
Schmittlein (2000)). Search engines range from the quite general type (e.g., Google.com searches
encompass most of the Internet) to the more focused ones (DealTime.com searches Internet stores,
hotels.com searches travel products, www.addall.com searches books, etc..). Sponsored search
involves advertisements placed above or along side the organic search results (See Figure 1 and
Figure 2). Given that users are inclined to view the topmost slots in the page (Ansari and Mela
(2003)), advertisers are willing to pay a premium for these more prominent slots (Goldfarb and
Tucker (2007)).
To capitalize on this premium, advertising slots are auctioned o¤ by search engines. Advertis-
ers specify bids on a per-click basis for a respective search term. Advertisers consider potential
competition, the cost of bidding, and the expected revenue accruing from the advertisement when
5January 2008 Web Server Survey, Netcraft Company (http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2008/01/28/
january_2008_web_server_survey.html).
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Figure 1: Searching chocolate phoneUsing A Generic Search Engine
3
Figure 2: Searching chocolate phoneUsing A Specialized Search Engine
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deciding how to bid. Though most search engines use auctions to price advertisements, there is
considerable variation in the nature of the auctions they use. For example Overture.com (who pio-
neered Internet search auctions and is now a part of Yahoo!) adopted a rst price auction wherein
the advertiser bidding the highest amount per click received the most prominent placement at the
cost of its own bid for each click.6 First price auctions are still used by Shopping.com and a number
of other Internet properties. However, because bids are priced on a per click basis, search engines
should be not only concerned with the magnitude of bid but also the likely number of clicks that an
advertisement will generate. For example, a high per-click bid with few or no clicks may generate
less revenue for a search engine than a low per-click bid advertisement with a high click-through
rate. Hence Google has developed an algorithm which factors in not only the level of the bid, but
the expected click-through rate of the advertiser. Another distinction of the Google practice is
that advertisers pay the next bidders bid (adjusted for click-through rates) as opposed to their
own bids.7 Moreover, Google and MSN recently enabled advertisers to bid by demographics or the
browsing history of the users, thus enabling even more precise targeting.
In light of the increased use of search engines by consumers, the attendant rise in search engine
advertising, and the resulting interest in pricing mechanisms on the part of the search engine, we
model the behavior of consumers and advertisers in order to obtain insights into the policy of the
search engine platform. Much like Yao and Mela (2007), we construct an empirical model of a two-
sided network in an auction context. One side of the network includes the searchers who generate
revenue for the advertiser. On the other side of the two-sided network are advertisers whose bidding
behavior determines the revenue of the search engine. In the middle lies the search engine. The
goal of the search engine is to price consumer information, set auction mechanisms, design web
page to elucidate product information so as to maximize its prots. By integrating these agents in
a single model, it becomes possible to explore the e¤ect of search engine strategy on the demand
and pricing for search engine advertising as well as the revenues of the search engine. In particular,
we consider the following policy simulations:
 Mechanism Design. The wide array of search pricing mechanisms raises the question of which
auction mechanism is the best in the sense of incenting advertisers to bid more aggressively
thereby yielding maximum returns for the search engine. We contrast the two most common
designs and their attendant revenue implications.
6 In the economics literature, such an auction with multiple items (slots) where bidders pay what they bid is
sometimes termed as discriminatory auction (Krishna (2002)).
7With a simplied setting, Edelman et al. (2007) show that the Google practice may result in an equilibrium with
bidderspayo¤s equivalent to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, whereas VCG auction has been proved to
be maximizing total payo¤s to bidders (Groves (1979)). Iyengar and Kumar (2006) further show that under some
conditions the Google practice induces VCG auctions dominant truth-telling bidding strategy, i.e., bidders will
bid their own valuations.
5
 Market Intelligence. Advertisersknowledge about consumers changes if search engines sell
consumer demographic and behavioral information to advertisers. The bidding strategy of
advertisers is likely altered by the change of their information state. This raises the question
of how information asymmetries between the engine and advertisers a¤ect bidding behavior
and how the consumer information should be priced.
 Customization and Targeting. Most search engines auction key words across all market seg-
ments. However, it is possible to auction key words by segment. We assess the potential
revenue implications of this strategy.
 Search Tools. Many search engines, especially specialized ones such as Shopping.com, provide
options to sort/lter search results using certain criteria such as product prices. On one hand,
sort/lter may intensify competition among advertisers by mitigating the perceived di¤erence
across goods (Diehl et al. (2003)). On the other hand, these tools can induce consumers
to focus on quality di¤erentiation thereby attenuating the competition (Lynch and Ariely
(2000)). This leads to the question of how such an easy access to products information
impacts consumer searching behavior and hence rmsadvertising decisions.
Though we cast our model in the context of sponsored search, we note that the problem,
and hence the conceptualization is even more general. Any interactive, addressable media format
(e.g., DVR, satellite digital radio) can be utilized to implement similar auctions for advertising.
For example, with the convergence in media between computers and television in DVRs, simple
channel or show queries can be accompanied by sponsored search and this medium may help to
o¤set advertising losses arising from ads skipping by DVR users. In such a notion, the research
literature on sponsored search auctions generalizes to a much broader context and our model serves
as a basis for exploring search based advertising.
1.2 Recent Literature
Research on sponsored search, commensurate with the topic it seeks to address, is nascent and
growing. This literature can be characterized along two distinct dimensions: theoretical and empir-
ical. The theoretical literature details how agents are likely to react to di¤erent pricing mechanisms.
One major conclusion of this literature is that the optimal pricing mechanism is incumbent upon
the behavior of the various agents. However, there is little attention directed to the issue of asym-
metries in information states between the advertiser and the platform. Moreover, the theoretical
literature does not measure how agents actually behave in a given market so it can not speak
to how changes in platform marketing strategy will manifest in a given market. In contrast, the
empirical literature measures the e¤ect of advertising on consumer response in a given market but
not the reaction of these agents to changes in the platform environment (e.g., advertising pricing,
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information state or the webpage design of the platform). Further, the empirical literature typically
focuses on the behavior of the advertiser but not that of the searchers or the marketing actions
of the search platform. Next, empirical work to date is largely silent on competitive interactions
between various advertisers. In sum, by integrating the theoretical and empirical research streams
we seek to develop a more complete representation of the role of pricing and information in the
context of key word search. To elaborate on these points, we begin by surveying theoretical work
on sponsored search and then proceed to discuss some recent empirical research.
Foundational theoretical analyses of sponsored search include Edelman et al. (2007) and Var-
ian (2006) who examine the bidding behaviors of advertisers in this auction game. The authors
assume the auction game as a complete information and simultaneous-move static game, in which
exogenous advertising click through rates increase with better placements. In equilibrium adver-
tiser bidding behavior has the same payo¤ structure as a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction, where a
winners payment to the seller equals to those losing bidderspotential payo¤s (opportunity costs)
were the winner absent (Groves (1979)). Extending this work, Chen and He (2006) incorporate
clicking behavior into their model and show that, under the Google bidding mechanism, consumers
clicking behavior is a¤ected by the easy access to product information. In particular, they make
inference about product quality based on the ranking presented by the platform and search se-
quentially according to the ranking. As an equilibrium response advertisers submit bids equal to
their true values for the advertising. Katona (2007) further extends the analysis by relaxing several
key assumptions such as the competition for tra¢ c between sponsored links and organic links, the
heterogeneity of advertisers in term of their inherent attractiveness to consumers. The author shows
multiple equilibria in this auction which do not have closed form solutions. Additional work by
Iyengar and Kumar (2006), Feng (2008), and Garg et al. (2006) explicitly consider the e¤ect of
the various auction mechanisms on search engine prots. In particular, Iyengar and Kumar (2006)
show that the Google pricing mechanism maximizes neither the search engines revenue nor the
e¢ ciency of the auction suggesting the potential to improve on this mechanism as we seek to do.
Further, they show that the optimal mechanism is incumbent upon the characteristics of the market
thereby making it imperative to estimate market response as we intend to do in order to improve
on pricing mechanisms.
In sum, the key insights from this stream of work are that i) there are three key sets of agents
interacting in the sponsored search context, persons that engage in key word search, advertisers
that bid for key words, and the search platform, ii) one can characterize how advertisers and
searchers will react to changes in the auction mechanisms employed by the search engine, iii)
searchers will react to the search engines web page design, which in turn will a¤ect advertisers
bidding behavior and iv) changes in advertiser behavior are incumbent upon the parameters of
the system; given these are not estimated it is hard to characterize precisely how these agents
will behave. Additionally, we note that the oft invoked assumption of a static advertiser game
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over bidding periods is inconsistent with the pricing practices used by search engines. Search
engines typically use the preceding periods click throughs together with current bids to determine
advertising placement, making this an inherently dynamic game. Finally, this research typically
assumes no asymmetry in information states between the advertiser and the search engine even
though the search engine knows individual level clicking behaviors and the advertiser does not. We
redress these issues in this paper.
Empirical research on sponsored search advertising is also proliferating. Notable among these
papers, Rutz and Bucklin (2007) investigate the e¢ cacy of di¤erent keyword choices by measuring
the conversion rate from usersclicks on ads to actual sales for the advertiser. In a related paper,
Rutz (2007) considers how advertiser revenue is a¤ected by click throughs and exposures. This
work is important because it demonstrates that advertiser valuations di¤er for various placements
and key words and that the bids are likely to be related to placements. Ghose and Yang (2007)
further investigate the relationships among di¤erent metrics such as click-through rate, conversion
rate, bid price and advertisement rank.
Overall, the empirical research on sponsored search establishes a rm link between advertising,
slot position and revenues  and indicates that these e¤ects can di¤er across advertisers. Yet
some limitations of this stream of work include its emphasis on a single agent (the advertiser) and
the lack of information on competing bidders, which make it di¢ cult to predict how advertisers
might react to a change in the auction mechanism, webpage design or information state regarding
consumers. Yet these interactions are material to understanding the role of each agent in the
context of sponsored search. For example, an advertisers value to the search engine pertains not
only to its payment to the search engine as is often assumed in past empirical work, but also the
e¤ect that advertiser has on the intensity of competition during bidding. The increased intensity
of competition may serve to drive bids upward and hence increase search engine revenues. Related,
advertisersactions a¤ect internet users. For example, with alternative advertisers being placed at
premium slots on a search result page, it is likely that usersbrowsing behaviors will be di¤erent.
Further, since advertisers make decisions with the consideration of usersreactions, any variations
of usersbehaviors have feedbacks on advertisersactions and thus will ultimately a¤ect the search
engines revenue. Hence when making policy prescriptions for the search engine, we believe that it
would be more reasonable to incorporate the theoretical work on strategic interaction in the context
of key word search into an empirical analysis of advertiser bidding behavior.
This suggests it is desirable to model and estimate the equilibrium behavior of all the agents in
a network setting. In this regard, sponsored search advertising can be characterized as a two-sided
market wherein searchers and advertisers interact on the platform of the search engine (Rochet
and Tirole (2006); Tucker (2005)). This enables us to generalize a structural modeling approach
advanced by Yao and Mela (2007) to study two-sided markets. These authors model bidder and
seller behavior in the context of electronic auctions to explore the e¤ect of auction house pricing on
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the equilibrium number of listings and closing prices. However, additional complexities exist in the
key word search setting including i) the aforementioned information asymmetry between advertisers
and the search engine and ii) the substantially more complex auction pricing mechanism used by
search engines relative to the xed fee auction house pricing considered in Yao and Mela (2007).
Moreover, unlike the pricing problem addressed in Yao and Mela (2007), sponsored search bidding
is inherently dynamic owing to the use of lagged advertising click rates to determine current period
advertising placements. Hence we incorporate the growing literature of two-step dynamic game
estimation (e.g., Hotz and Miller (1993); Bajari et al. (2007); Bajari and Hong (2006)). Instead of
explicitly solving for the equilibrium dynamic bidding strategies, the two-step estimation approach
assumes that observed bids are generated by equilibrium play and then use the distribution of
bids to infer underlying primitive variables of bidders (e.g., the advertisers expectation about the
return from advertising). Similar method is also used in an auction context in Jofre-Bonet and
Pesendorfer (2003). However, our approach is unique inasmuch as it is Bayesian instantiation
of these estimators, which leads to desirable small sample properties and enables considerable
exibility in modeling choices. Equipped with these advertiser primitives, we solve the dynamic
game played by the advertiser to ascertain how changes in search engine policy a¤ect equilibrium
bidding behavior.
In sum, our goal is to develop an integrated model of key word search that incorporates the
behavior of both searchers and advertisers. This approach enables us to investigate how the policies
of the search engine a¤ect its revenues. Such policies include the marketing of information, targeted
bidding, pricing mechanisms and webpage design among others. This goal mandates the use of a
dynamic structural model of key word search and, to our knowledge, this paper is the rst to
integrate empirical and theoretical work on key word search to develop such an approach and to
provide some explicit prescriptions for the marketing policies of search engines.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Given the relatively novel research context,
we begin by describing the data to help make the problem more concrete. We then outline the
details of our model beginning with the clicking behavior of consumers and concluding with the
advertiser bidding behavior. Next, we turn to estimation and present our results. We then explore
the role of information asymmetry, targeted bidding, advertising pricing and webpage design by
developing policy simulations which alter the search engine marketing strategies. We conclude with
some future directions.
2 Empirical Context
The data underpinning our analysis is drawn from a major search engine for high technology
consumer products. Within this broad search domain, we consider search for music management
software because the category is relatively isolated in the sense that searches for this product do
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not compete with others on the site. The category is a sizable one as well for this search engine.
Along with the increasing popularity of MP3 players, the use of music management PC software is
increasing exponentially making this an important source of revenue. The goal of the search engine
is to enable consumers to identify and then download trial versions of these software before their
nal purchase.8 It should be noted that the search engine denes the music management broadly
enough that an array of di¤erent search terms (e.g., MP3, iTunes, iPod, lyric, etc.) yield the same
search results for the software products in this category. Hence we consider the consumer decision
of whether to search for music software on the site and whether to download given a search.
Because consumers are far more likely to click on links near the top of the search results
page, advertisers compete for these slots by attending the auction.9 More successful bids lead to
appearances closer to the top of the list. Winning bids are denoted as sponsored search results and
the site ags these as sponsored links. The site a¤ords up to ve premium slots which is far less
than the 400 or so products that would appear at the search engine. Losing bidders and non-bidders
are listed beneath the top slots on the page and like previous literature we denote these listings as
organic search results. We seek to model this bidding behavior.
The search engine captures data on advertisers (products attributes, products download history
and bids from active bidders), consumers (their visitation log les and demographics), and relevant
site characteristics from the search engine platform (such as page characteristics and link order).
We detail these data next.
2.1 Data Description
The data are comprised of 3 les, including:
 Bidding le. Bidding is logged into a le containing the bidding history of all active bidders
from January 2005 till August 2007. It records the exact bids submitted, the time of each
bid submission and the resulting monthly allocation of slots. Hence, the unit of analysis is
vendor-bid event. These data form the cornerstone of our bidding model.
 Products le. Product attributes are kept in a le that records, for each software rm in each
month, the characteristics of the software they purvey. This le also indicates the download
history of each product in each month.
 Consumers le. Consumer log les record each visit to the site and is used to infer whether
downloads occur as well as browsing histories. A separate but related le includes registration
8A clickand a downloadare essentially the same from the perspectives of the advertiser, the consumer as well
as the search engine. In the clickcase, a consumers makes several clicks to investigate and compare products o¤ered
by di¤erent vendors and then make a nal purchase. In the downloadcase, a consumer downloads several products
and makes the comparison before a nal purchase. Hence there is no di¤erence for a clickand a downloadin the
current context. We use clickand download interchangeably throughout the paper.
9We detail the specic rules of the bidding process when describing the bidder model in section 3.2.
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information and detailed demographics for those site visitors that are registered. These data
are central to the bidding model in the context of complete information.
We detail each of these les in turn.
2.1.1 Bidding File
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the bidding les. At this search engine, bids were submitted
on a monthly basis. Over the 32 months from January 2005 to August 2007, 322 bids (including
zeros) were submitted by 21 software companies.10 As indicated in Table 1, bidders on average
submitted about 22 positive bids in this interval (slightly less than once per month). The average
bid amount (conditioned on bidding) was $0.20 with a large variance across bidders and time.
Table 1: Bids Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Non-zero Bids (c/) 19.55 8.32 15 55
Non-zero Bids/Bidder 21.78 10.46 1 30
All Bids (c/) 8.14 11.04 0 55
Bids/Bidder 23.13 9.68 1 32
2.1.2 Product File
Searching for a key word results in a list of relevant software products and their respective attributes
(which may vary over time). Attribute information is stored in a product le along with the
download history of all products that appeared in this category from January 2005 to August
2007. In total, these data cover 394 products over 32 months. The attributes include the price of
the non-trial version of a product, backward compatibility with preceding operating systems (e.g.,
Windows 98 and Windows Server 2003), expert ratings provided by the site and consumer ratings
of the product.11 Trial versions typically come with a 30-day license to use the product for free,
after which consumers are expected to pay for its use. Expert ratings at the site are collected from
several industrial experts of these products. The consumer rating is based on the average feedback
score about the product from consumers. Tables 2 and 3 give summary statistics for all products
as well as active biddersproducts. Based on the compatibility information, we sum each products
compatibility dummies and dene this summation as a measure for that products compatibility
with old and unpopular OS. This variable is later used in our estimation.
Overall, active biddersproducts have higher prices, better ratings and more frequent updates.
10Since some products were launched after January 2005, they were not observed in all periods.
11We further considered le size but found many missing values. Moreover, in light of increased Internet speed, le
size has become somewhat inconsequential in the download decision and is omitted from our analysis.
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Table 2: Product Compatibility
Percentage
All Products
Windows NT 4.0 54
Windows 98 64
Windows Me 66
Windows 2000 91
Windows Server 2003 43
BiddersProducts
Windows NT 4.0 67
Windows 98 67
Windows Me 71
Windows 2000 85
Windows Server 2003 57
Table 3: Product Attributes and Downloads
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
All Products
Non-trial Version Price $ 16.65 20.43 0 150
Expert Rating (if rated) 3.87 0.81 2 5
Average Consumer Rating (if rated) 3.89 1.31 1 5
Months Lapse Since Last Update 15.31 9.88 1 31
Compatibility Index 3.29 1.47 0 5
Number of Downloads/(ProductMonth) 1367.29 9257.16 0 184442
BiddersProducts
Non-trial Version Price $ 21.97 15.87 0 39.95
Expert Rating (if rated) 4 0.50 3 5
Average Consumer Rating (if rated) 4.06 0.91 2.5 5
Months Lapse Since Last Update 2.38 0.66 1 3
Compatibility Index 3.51 1.51 0 5
Number of Downloads/(ProductMonth) 1992.12 6557.43 0 103454
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2.1.3 Consumer File
This le contains the log le of consumers from May 2007 till August 2007. The consumers le
contains each consumers browsing log when they visit the search engine. It also has the registration
information if a consumer has registered with the search engine before.
The browsing log of a consumer records the entry time, browsing path and duration of the
visit. It also indicates whether the consumer made downloads and, if yes, which products she
downloaded. Upon viewing the search results of software products, the search engine allowed the
consumer to sort the results based on some attributes such as the ratings; consumers can also lter
products based on some criteria such as whether a products non-trial version is free. The browsing
log records the sorting and ltering actions of each consumer.
Since the demographic information upon the registration is only optional, the dataset provides
little if any reliable demographics of consumers. So we only focus on whether a consumer is a
registered user of the search engine.
3 Model
The model must capture the behaviors of the two key agents interacting on the search engine
platform: i) advertisers who bid to maximize their respective prots and ii) utility maximizing
consumers who decide whether to click on the advertisers link. For any given policy applied by
the search engine, this integrated model enables us to predict equilibrium revenues for the search
engine. Recognizing that the behavior of the bidder (advertiser) is conditional on the behavior of
the consumer, we begin with the consumer model and then solve the bidder problem conditional
on the consumer behavior.
3.1 Consumer Model
Advertiser prot (and therefore bidding strategy) is incumbent upon their forecast of consumer
downloads for their products d(k;Xtj ; 
c), where k denotes the position of the advertisement on
the search engine results page, Xtj indicate the attributes of the advertiser js product at time t
and 
c are parameters to be estimated. Thus, we seek to develop a forecast for d(k;Xtj ; 
c) and
the attendant consequences for bidding. To be consistent with the advertisers information set, we
begin by basing these forecasts of consumer behavior solely on statistics observed by the advertiser:
the aggregate download data and the distribution of consumers characteristics. Later, in the policy
section of the paper, we assess what happens to bidding behavior and platform revenues when
disaggregate information is revealed to advertisers by the platform. We begin by describing the
consumers download decision process and how it a¤ects the overall number of downloads.
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Figure 3: Consumer Decisions
3.1.1 The Consumer Decision Process
Figure 3 overviews the decisions made by consumers. In any given period t, the consumers problem
is whether and which software to select in order to maximize their utility. The resolution of this
problem is addressed by a series of conditional decisions.
First, the consumer decides whether she should use search on the category considered in this
analysis (C1). We presume that the consumer will search if it maximizes her expected utility to do
so.
Conditioned upon engaging a search, the consumer next decides whether to sort and/or lter
the results (C2). Sorting re-orders the search results by a specied criterion such as the rating of
a software. Filtering excludes various products from consideration based on the product attributes
(e.g., the price of the software). The two search options lead to the following 4 options for viewing
the results:  ={0 neither, 1 sorting but not ltering, 2 not sorting but ltering, 3 sorting
and ltering}. For each option, the set of products returned by the search engine di¤ers in terms
of the number and the order of products. Consumers choose the sorting/ltering option that
maximizes their expected utility.
Third, the consumer then chooses which, if any products to download (C3). We presume that
consumers choose to download software if it maximizes their expected utility. We discuss the
modeling details for this process in a backward induction manner (C3C1).
Download We assume that consumers exhibit heterogeneous preferences for the products and
these consumers choose products to download to maximize their expected payo¤s. Consumer i
of preference segment g (g = 1; 2; :::; G) has some underlying latent utility ugijt for downloading
software j in period t, conditional on her sorting/ltering choice . A product will be downloaded
if and only if ugijt  0. Let a index product attributes
ugijt = egj +Xa xjatega + e"gijt (1)
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where
 xjat is the observed attribute a of product j; product attributes also includes product js
slot k on the search page that may vary conditional on sorting/ltering choice  (hence the
superscript );
 ega is consumer is tasteregarding product attribute a, which is segment specic;
 e"gijts are individual idiosyncratic preference shocks, realized after the sorting/ltering de-
cision. They are independently and identically distributed over individuals, products and
periods as zero mean normal random variables.
To allow the variance of the download (e"gijt) and sorting/ltering errors (git , which will be
detailed below) to di¤er, both must be properly scaled (cf., Train (2003), Chapter 2). Hence we
invoke the following assumption.
Assumption 1: e"gijts are independently and identically distributed normal random variables with
mean 0 and variance normalized to (g)2  2=6. git s are independently and identically distributed
Type I extreme value random variables with variance normalized to 2=6.
Under assumption 1, we may re-dene the utility in equation 1 as
ugijt = 
g=
p
6(gj +
X
a
xjat
g
a| {z }
ugijt
+ "gijt) (2)
where fgj ; ga; "gijtg = fegj ; ega;e"gijtg=(g=p6); ugijt is the scaled meanutility and "gijt  N(0; 1).
The resulting choice process is a multivariate probit choice model.12 Let dijt = 1 stand for down-
loading and dijt = 0 stand for not downloading. We have
dijt =
(
1
0
if ugijt  0
otherwise
(3)
and the probability of downloading conditional on parameters fgj ; gag is
Pr(dijt = 1) = Pr(u
g
ijt  0) (4)
= Pr(g=
p
6(ugijt + "
g
ijt)  0)
= Pr( "gijt  ugijt)
= (ugijt)
where () is the standard normal distribution CDF.
12 It can be shown that, under very weak assumptions, download decisions across multiple products with the purpose
of maximizing total expected utility can be represented by a multivariate binary choice probit model.
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Sorting and Filtering Prior to making a download decision, consumers face several ltering
and sorting options which we index as  = 0; 1; 2; 3. We expect consumers to choose the option
that maximizes their expected download utility. Although consumers know the distribution of
the product utility error terms (e"gijt), these error terms do not realize before the sorting/ltering.
Hence consumers can only form an expectation about the total utilities of all products under a
given sorting/ltering option  before choosing that option. Let Ugit denote the total expected
utility from products under option , which can be calculated based on equation 1:
Ugit =
X
j
E"(u
g
ijtjugijt  0)Pr(ugijt  0) (5)
This denition reects that a products utility is realized only when it is downloaded. Hence,
the expected utility E"(u
g
ijtjugijt  0) is weighted by the download likelihood, Pr(ugijt  0). The
expectation, E"(), is taken over the random preference shocks "gijt.
In addition to Ugit , individuals may accrue additional benets or costs for using sorting/ltering
option . These benets or costs may arise from individual di¤erences of e¢ ciency or experience
in terms of engaging the various options for ordering products. We denote such benets or costs
by random terms git s. As indicated in assumption 1, 
g
it s are i.i.d. Type I extreme value. 
g
it is
not observed by researchers but known to individual i. Note that these sorting/ltering benets or
costs do not materialize during the consumption of the products. Therefore they do not enter the
latent utility in equation (1). The total utility of search option  is thus given by
zgit = U
g
it + 
g
it (6)
Consumers choose the option of sorting/ltering that leads to the highest total utility zgit .
With git following a Type I extreme value distribution, the choice of sorting/ltering becomes
a logit model such that
Pr()git =
exp(Ugit )
3P
0=0
exp(Ug
0
it )
(7)
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To better appreciate the properties of this model, note that Ugit in equation 5 can be written
in a closed form.13
Ugit =
X
j
E"(u
g
ijtjugijt  0)  Pr(ugijt  0) (8)
= g=
p
6
X
j
 
ugijt +
(ugijt)
(ugijt)
!
 (ugijt)
With such a formulation, the factors driving the persons choice of ltering or sorting become
more apparent:
 Filtering eliminates options with negative utility, such as highly priced products (because
consumer price sensitivity is negative). As a result, the summation in 8 for the lter option
will increase as the negative ugijt are removed. This raises the value of the lter option
suggesting that price sensitive people are more likely to lter on price.
 Sorting re-orders products by their attribute levels. Products that appear low on a page will
typically have lower utility regardless of their product content (because consumer slot rank
sensitivity is negative). For example, suppose a consumer relies more on product ratings. By
moving more desirable items that have high ratings up the list, sorting can increase the ugijt
for these items, thereby increasing the resulting summation in 8 and the value of this sorting
option.14
Keyword Search The conditional probability of keyword search takes the form
Pr(searchgi ) =
exp(g0 + 
g
1IV
g
it )
1 + exp(g0 + 
g
1IV
g
it )
(9)
13For a normal random variable x with mean , standard deviation  and left truncated at a (Greene (2003)),
E(xjx  a) = + (a 

), where (a 

) is the hazard function such that (a 

) =
( a 

)
1 ( a 

)
.
Hence with ugijt  N(g=
p
6ugijt; (
g)22=6), we have
E(ugijtjugijt  0)
= (g=
p
6  ugijt + g=
p
6 
(  
g=
p
6ugijt
g=
p
6
)
1  (  
g=
p
6ugijt
g=
p
6
)
)
= g=
p
6(ugij +
(ugij )
(ugij )
)
14 In particular, in the data over 80% consumers who used sorting option chose ratings to re-order products. Thus,
we suspect consumers who rely on ratings are more likely to use the sorting option to see which items are the most
popular ones.
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where IV gi is the inclusive value for searching conditional on the segment membership. IV
g
it is
dened as
IV git = log[
X

exp(Ugit )] (10)
This specication can be interpreted as the consumer making decision to use a key word search
based on the rational behavior of utility maximization (cf. McFadden (1977); Ben-Akiva and
Lerman (1985)).15 A search term is more likely to be invoked if it yields higher expected utility. In
our data, we focus on a single search term.
3.1.2 Segment Membership
Recognizing that consumers are heterogeneous in their behaviors described above, we apply a latent
class model in the spirit of Kamakura and Russell (1989) to capture heterogeneity in consumer
preferences. Heterogeneity in preference can arise, for example, when some consumers prefer some
features more than others. We assume G exogenously determined segments. Consumer decisions
vary across segments. Consumers are homogeneous within the same segment. Segment-specic
heterogeneity is stable across time.16
The prior probability for user i being a member of segment g is dened as
pggit = exp
 
g0 +Demo
0
it
g

=Gg0=1 exp

g
0
0 +Demo
0
it
g0

(11)
where Demo0it is a vector of attributes of user i such as demographics and past browsing his-
tory; vector fg0; gg8g contains parameters to be estimated. For the purpose of identication, one
segments parameters are normalized to zero.
In light of the foregoing model, the probability of user i downloading product j in period t is
Pijt (12)
=
Z
Demoit
X
g
X

[(ugijt)
exp(Ugit )
3P
0=0
exp(Ug
0
it )
] Pr(searchgit)pg
g
itdD(Demoit)
where the rst term in the brackets captures the download likelihood, the second term captures the
search strategy likelihood, and the rst term outside the brackets captures the likelihood of search.
D(Demoit) is the distribution of demographics. Since advertisers only know the distribution of
demographics, the resulting probability must integrate over the demographics.
15This specication is consistent with the consumer information structure such that gi is not observed by re-
searchers but known to consumer i.
16 It is possible to allow for continous mixtures of heterogeneity as well. In our application, many consumers enter
only once making it di¢ cult to identify a consumer specic term for them.
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Figure 4: Advertiser Decisions
Correspondingly, the advertiser has an expected number of downloads for appearing in slot k,
d(k;Xtj ; 
c), which can be computed as follows
d(k;Xtj ; 
c) =MtPijt (13)
where 
c is the set of consumer preference parameters; Mt is the market size in period t.
3.2 Advertiser Model
Figure 4 overviews the dynamic game played by the advertiser. Advertiser js problem is to
decide the optimal bid amount btj with the objective of maximizing discounted present value of
payo¤s. Higher bids lead to greater revenues because they yield more favorable positions on the
search engine, thereby yielding more click-throughs for the advertiser. However, higher bids also
increase costs (payments) leading to a trade-o¤ between costs and revenues. The optimal decision
of whether and how much to bid is incumbent upon the bidding mechanism, the characteristics of
the advertiser, the information available at the time of bidding (including the state variables), and
the nature of competitive interactions.
An advertisers period prot for a download is the value it receives from the download less
the costs (payments) of the download. Though we do not observe the value of a download, we
infer this value by noting the observed bid can be rationalized only for a particular value accrued
by the advertiser. We presume this value is drawn from a distribution known to all rms. The
total period revenue for the advertiser is then the value per download times the expected number
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of downloads.17 The total period payment upon winning is the number of downloads times the
advertisers bid. Hence, the total expected period prot is the number of downloads times the prot
per download (i.e., the value per downloads less the payment per download).
Of course, the bid levels and expected download rates are a¤ected by rules of the auction.
Though we elaborate in further details on the specic rules of bidding below, at this point we
simply note that the rules of the auction favor advertisers whose products were downloaded more
frequently in the past since such products are more likely to lead to higher revenues for the plat-
form.18 Current period downloads are, in turn, a¤ected by the position of the advertisement on
the search engine. Because past downloads a¤ect current placement, and thus current downloads,
the advertiser problem is inherently dynamic; and past downloads are treated as a state variable.
Finally, given the rules of the auction, we note that all advertisers move simultaneously. While
we presume a rm knows its own value, we assume competing rms know only the distribution of
this value.
The process is depicted in Figure 4. We describe the process with more details as follows:
Section 3.2.1 details the rules of the auction that a¤ect the seller costs (A2), section 3.2.2 details
the advertisers value distribution (A1) and section 3.2.3 indicates how period values and costs
translate to discounted prots and the resulting optimal bidding strategy (A3).
3.2.1 Seller Costs and the Bidding Mechanism
We begin by discussing how slot positions are allocated with respect to bids and the e¤ect of these
slot positions on consumer downloads (and thus advertiser revenue).
Upon a consumer completing a query, the search engine returns k = 1; 2; :::K; :::; N slots covering
the products of all rms. Only the top K = 5 slots are considered as premium slots. Auctions for
these K premium slots are held every period (t = 1; 2; :::). An advertiser seeks to appear in a more
prominent slot because this may increase demand for the advertisers product. Slots K + 1 to N
are non-premium slots which compose a section called organic search section.
In order to procure a more favorable placement, advertiser j submits bid btj in period t. These
bids, submitted simultaneously, are summarized by the vector bt = fbt1; bt2; :::; btNg.19 Should an
advertiser win slot k, the realized number of downloads dtj is a random draw from the distribution
with the expectation d(k;Xtj ; 
c). The placement of advertisers into the K premium slots is deter-
mined by the ranking of their fbtjdt 1j g8j , i.e. the product of current bid and last period realized
downloads; the topmost bidder gets the best premium slot; the second bidder gets the second best
17The expected number of downloads is inferred form the consumer model and we have derived this expression in
section 3.1.2.
18This is because the payment made to the search engine by an advertiser is the advertisers bid times its total
downloads.
19For the purpose of a clear exposition, we sometimes use boldface notations or pairs of braces to indicate vectors
whose elements are variables across all bidders. For example, dt = fdtjg8j is a vector whose elements are dtj ;8j.
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premium slot and so on. A winner of one premium slot pays its own bid btj for each download in
current period. Hence the total payment for winning the auction is btjd
t
j .
If an advertiser is not placed at one of the K premium slots, it will appear in the organic
section; advertisers placed in the organic section do not pay for downloads from consumers. The
ranking in the organic search section is determined by product update recency at period t, which is
a component of the attribute vector of each product, Xtj . Other attributes include price, consumer
ratings and so on. For our purpose, we assume Xtj is exogenously determined. These attributes are
posted on the search engine and are common knowledge.
Given that the winners are determined in part by the previous periods downloads, the auction
game is inherently dynamic. Before submitting a bid, the commonly observed state variables at
time t are the realized past downloads of all bidders from period t  1.20
st = dt 1 = fdt 11 ; dt 12 ; :::; dt 1N g (14)
3.2.2 Seller Value
The advertisers bid determines the cost of advertising and must be weighed against the potential
return when deciding how much to bid. We denote advertiser js valuation regarding one download
of its product in period t as vtj . We assume that this valuation is private information but drawn
from a normal distribution that is commonly known to all advertisers. Specically,
vtj = v(X
t
j ; ) +R
t
j (15)
= v(Xtj ; ) + rj + r
t
j
= Xtj + rj + r
t
j
where  are parameters to be estimated and reect the e¤ect of product attributes on valuation;
and Rtj = rj + r
t
j . rj and r
t
j are independent random terms. rj  N(0;  21) is a random e¤ect term
assumed to be identically and independently distributed across advertisers. This random term
captures heterogeneity in valuations that may arise from unobserved rm specic e¤ects such as
more e¢ cient operations. rtj  N(0;  22) is a private shock to an advertisers valuation in period
t, assumed to be identically and independently distributed across advertisers and periods. The
sources of this private shock may include: (1) temporary increases in the advertisers valuation due
to some events such as a promotion campaign; (2) unexpected shocks to the advertisers budget for
nancing the payments of the auction; (3) temporary production capacity constraint for delivering
20Though state variables can be categorized as endogeneous (past downloads) and exogenous (product attributes),
our exposition characterizes only downloads as state variables because these are the only states whose evolution is
subject to a dynamic constraint.
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the product to users and so on. Given the distributions of rj and rtj , the distribution of R
t
j is
N(0;  21 +  
2
2).
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3.2.3 Seller Prots: A Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE)
Given state variable st, vtj , predicted downloads and search engines auction rules, bidder j decides
the optimal bid amount btj with the objective of maximizing discounted present value of payo¤s. In
light of this, every advertiser has an expected period payo¤, which is a function of st, Xt, Rtj and
all advertisersbids bt
Ej
 
bt; st;Xt; Rtj ; 

(16)
=
XK
k=1
Pr
 
kjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt
  (vtj   btj)  d(k;Xtj ; 
c)
+
XN
k=K+1
Pr
 
kjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt
  vtj  d(k;Xtj ; 
c)
=
XK
k=1
Pr
 
kjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt
  (Xtj + rj + rtj   btj)  d(k;Xtj ; 
c)
+
XN
k=K+1
Pr
 
kjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt
  (Xtj + rj + rtj)  d(k;Xtj ; 
c)
where the expectation for prots is taken over other advertisersbids bt j . Pr (kj) is the conditional
probability of advertiser j getting slot k, k = 1; 2; :::; N . Pr (kj) depends on not only bids, but
also states st (the previous periods downloads) and product attributes Xt.22 This is because: i)
the premium slot allocation is determined by the ranking of fbtjdt 1j g8j , where dt 1 are the state
variables and ii) the organic slot allocation is determined by product update recency, an element
of Xt.
In addition to the current period prot, an advertiser also takes its expected future payo¤s into
account when making decisions. In period t, given the state vector st, advertiser js discounted
expected future payo¤s evaluated prior to the realization of the private shock Rtj is given by
E
hX1
=t
 tj
 
b ; s ;X ; Rj ; 
a
 jsti (17)
where 
a = f;  0g and  0 = f 1;  2g.  is a common discount factor. The expectation is taken
over the random term Rtj , bids in period t as well as all future realization of X
t, shocks, bids and
state variables. The state variables st+1 in period t + 1 is drawn from a probability distribution
P
 
st+1jbt; st;Xt.
21The random shock rtj is realized at the beginning of period t. Although r
t
j is private knowledge, the distribution
of rtj  N(0;  22) is common knowledge among bidders. Further, the random e¤ect rj of bidder j are known to all
bidders but not to researchers. Given bidders may observe opponentsactions for many periods, the random e¤ect
can be perfectly inferred (Greene (2003)).
22Note that st and Xt are observed by all bidders before bidding.
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We use the concept of a pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) to model the bidders
problem of whether and how much to bid in order to maximize the discounted expected future
prots (Bajari et al. (2007); Ryan and Tucker (2007); Dubé et al. (2008); and others). The
MPE implies that each bidders bidding strategy only depends on the then-current prot-related
information, including state, Xt and its private shock Rtj . Hence we can describe the equilibrium
bidding strategy of bidder j as a function j

st;Xt; Rtj

= btj . Given a state vector s and product
attributes X and prior to the realization of current Rj (with the time index t suppressed), bidder
js expected payo¤ under the equilibrium strategy prole  = f1; 2; :::; Ng can be expressed
recursively as:
Vj (s;X;) = E

j (; s;X; Rj ; 
a) + 
Z
s0
Vj
 
s0;X0;

dP
 
s0jb; s;X js (18)
where the expectation is taken over current and future realizations of random terms R and X.
The advertiser model can then be used in conjunction with the consumer model to forecast
advertiser behavior as we shall discuss in the policy simulation section. In a nutshell, we presume
advertiser will choose bids to maximize their expected prots. A change in information states,
bidding mechanisms or webpage design will lead to an attendant change in bids conditioned on the
advertisers value function which we estimate as described next.
4 Estimation
4.1 An Overview
Though it is standard to estimate dynamic MPE models via a dynamic programming approach
such as a nested xed point estimator (Rust (1994)), this requires one to repetitively evaluate the
value function (18) through dynamic programming for each instance in which the parameters of
the value function are updated. Even when feasible, it is computationally demanding to implement
this approach. Instead, we consider the class of two-step estimators. The two-step estimators
are predicated upon the notion that the dynamic program can be estimated in two steps that
dramatically simplify the estimation process by facilitating the computation of the value function.
Specically, in this application we implement the two-step estimator proposed by Bajari et al.
(2007) (BBL henceforth).
As can be seen in equation 18, the value function is parameterized by the primitives of the value
distribution 
a = f;  0g. Under the assumption that advertisers are behaving rationally, these
advertiser private values for clicks should be consistent with observed bidding strategies. Therefore,
in the second step estimation, values of 
a = f;  0g are chosen so as to make the observed bidding
strategies to be congruent with rational behavior. We detail this step in Section 4.3 below.
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However, as can be observed in equations 18 and 16, computation of the value function is also
incumbent upon i) the bidding policy function that maps bids to the states (downloads), product
attributes, and private shocks j

st;Xt; Rtj

= btj ; ii) the expected downloads d(k;X
t
j ; 
c); and
iii) a function that maps the likelihood of future states as a function of current states and actions
P
 
st+1jbt; st;Xt. These are estimated in the rst step as detailed in Section 4.2 below and then
substituted into the value function used in the second step estimation.
4.2 First Step Estimation
In the rst step of the estimation we seek to obtain:
1. A partialpolicy function ej (s;X) describing the equilibrium bidding strategies as a function
of the observed state variables and product attributes, X. We estimate the policy function
by noting that players adopt equilibrium strategies (or decision rules) and that behaviors
generated from these decision rules lead to correlations between i) the observed states (i.e.,
past period downloads) and product characteristics and ii) advertiser decisions (i.e., bids).
The partial policy function captures this correlation. In our case, we use a random e¤ects
Tobit model to link bids to states and product characteristics as described in Section A.1.1
of the Appendix. Subsequently, the full policy function j (s;X; Rj) can be inferred based onej (s;X) and the distribution of private random shocks Rj . The partial policy function can
be thought of as the marginal distribution of the full policy function. Inferences regarding
the parameters of the full policy function can be made by nding the distribution of Rj that,
when integrated out, leads to the best rationalization for the observed bids. We discuss
our approach to infer the full policy functions from the partial policy function in Appendix
A.1.1.
2. The expected downloads for a given rm at a given slot, d(k;Xj ; 
c). The d(k;Xj ; 
c) follows
directly from the consumer model. Hence, the rst step estimation involves i) estimating the
parameters of the consumer model and then ii) using these estimates to compute the expected
number of downloads. The expected total number of downloads as a function of slot position
and product attributes is obtained by using the results of the consumer model to forecast
the likelihood of each person downloading the software and then summing these probabilities
across persons.23 We discuss our approach for determining the expected downloads in Section
A.1.2 of the Appendix.
23As an aside we note that advertisers have limited information from which to form expectations about total
downloads because they observe only the aggregate information of downloads but not the individual specic download
decisions. Hence advertisers must infer the distribution of consumer preferences from these aggregate statistics. In
a subsequent policy simulation we allow the search engine to provide individual level information to advertisers in
order to assess how it a¤ects advertiser behavior and therefore search engine revenues.
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3. The state transition probability P (s0jb; s;X) which describes the distribution of future states
(current period downloads) given observations of the current state (past downloads), product
attributes and actions (current period bids). These state transitions can be derived by i)
using the policy function to predict bids as a function of past downloads, ii) determining the
slot ranking as a function of these bids, past downloads and product attributes, and then iii)
using the consumer model to predict the number of current downloads as a function of slot
position. Details regarding our approach to determining the state transition probabilities is
outlined in Section A.1.3 of the Appendix.
With the rst step estimates of j (s;X; Rj) ; d(k;Xj ; 
c) and P (s0jb; s;X), we can compute
the value function in 18 as a function with only 
a = f;  0g unknown. In the second step we
estimate these parameters.
4.3 Second Step Estimation
The goal of the second step estimation is to recover the primitives of the bidder value function,

a = f;  0g: The intuition behind how the second-stage estimation works is that true parameters
should rationalize the observed data. For biddersdata to be generated by rational plays, we need
Vj (s;X;j ; j ; 
a)  Vj
 
s;X;0j ; j ; 
a

;80j 6= j (19)
where j is the equilibrium policy function; 0j is some deviations from j . This equation means
that any deviations from the observed equilibrium bidding strategy will not result in more prots.
Otherwise, the strategy would not be optimal. Hence, we rst simulate the value functions under
the equilibrium policy j and the deviated policy 0j (i.e., the left hand side and the right hand
side of equation 19). Then we try to choose 
a = f;  0g to maximize the likelihood that equation
19 holds. We describe the details of this second step estimation in Appendix A.2.
4.4 Sampling Chain
With the posterior distributions for the advertiser and consumer models established, we estimate
the models using MCMC approach as detailed in Appendix B. This is a notable deviation from
prior research that uses a gradient based technique. The advantage of using a Bayesian approach,
as long as suitable parametric assumptions can be invoked, is that it facilitates model convergence,
has desirable small sample properties, increases statistical e¢ ciency, and enables the estimation of
a wide array of functional forms (Rossi et al. (2005)). Hence we seek to make a methodological
contribution to the burgeoning literature on two-step estimators for dynamic games.
25
5 Results
5.1 First Step Estimation Results
Recall, the goal of the rst step estimation is to determine the policy function, j

st;Xt; Rtj

, the
expected downloads d(k;Xtj ; 
c); and the state transition probabilities P
 
st+1jbt; st;Xt : To deter-
mine j

st;Xt; Rtj

, we rst estimate the partial policy function ej  st;Xt and then compute the
full policy function. To determine d(k;Xtj ; 
c); we rst estimate the consumer model and then com-
pute the expected downloads. Last P
 
st+1jbt; st;Xt is derived from the consumer model and the
partial policy function. Thus, in the rst stage we need only to estimate the partial policy function
and the consumer model. With these estimates in hand we compute j

st;Xt; Rtj

; d(k;Xtj ; 
c);
and P
 
st+1jbt; st;Xt for use in the second step. Thus, below, we report the estimates for the
partial policy function and the consumer model on which these functions are all based.
5.1.1 Partial Policy Function ej(s;X)
The vector of independent variables (s;X) for the partial policy function (i.e., the Tobit model
of advertiser behavior that captures their bidding policy as outlined in Appendix section A.1.1)
contains the following variables:
 Product js state variable, last period download dt 1j . We reason that high past downloads
increase the likelihood of a favorable placement and therefore a¤ect bids.
 Two market level variables, the sum of last period downloads from all bidders and the number
of bidders in last period. Since we only have 322 observations of bids, it is infeasible to estimate
a parameter to reect the e¤ect of each opponents state (i.e., competition) on the optimal bid.
Moreover, it is unlikely a bidder can monitor every opponents state in each period before
bidding because such a strategy carries high cognitive and time costs. Hence, summary
measures provide a reasonable approximation of competing states in a limited information
context. Others in the literature who have invoked a similar approach include Jofre-Bonet
and Pesendorfer (2003) and Ryan (2006). Like them, we nd this provides a fair model t.
Another measure of competitive intensity is the number of opponents. Given bidders cannot
directly observe the number of competitors in the current period, we used a lagged measure
of the number of bidders.
 Product js attributes in period t (Xtj); including its non-trial version price, expert rating,
consumer rating, update recency and compatibility with old/unpopular OS. We expect that
a higher quality product will yield greater downloads thereby a¤ecting the bidding strategy.
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 To control the possible e¤ect of the growth of ownership of MP3 players, we also collect
the average lagged price of all new MP3 players in the market from a major online retailing
platform (www.pricegrabber.com).
Table 4 reports the estimation results for the Tobit model. As a measure of t of the model,
we simulated 10,000 bids from the estimated distribution. The probability of observing a positive
simulated bid is 41:0%; the probability of observing a positive bid in the real data is 41:6%.
Conditional on observing a positive simulated bid, those bids have a mean of $0:20 with a standard
deviation of $0:07. In the data the mean of observed positive bids is $0:20 and the standard
deviation is $0:08. We also estimate the same model only using 70% (227=322) of the observations
and use the left 30% as a holdout sample. The estimates have minimal changes. We then use the
holdout to simulate 10,000 bids. The probability of observing a positive bid is 40:2% while there
are 41:1% positive bids in the holdout sample. Among the positive simulated bids, the mean is
$0:22 and the standard deviation is $0:09. The corresponding statistics in the holdout is $0:21 and
$0:11. Overall, the t is good.
Table 4: Bidding Function Estimates
Median 95% Interval
'
Constant  10:55 ( 15:23; 6:78)
Lagged Downloadsjt/103  0:12 ( 0:16; 0:08)
Total Lagged Downloadst/103 0:04 (0:01; 0:08)
Lagged Number of Bidderst 0:04 ( 0:55; 0:26)
Lapse Since Last Updatejt  0:41 ( 0:85; 0:05)
Non-trial Version Pricejt 0:37 (0:31; 0:39)
Expert Ratingsjt 0:44 ( 6:30; 2:77)
Consumer Ratingsjt 0:92 (0:09; 1:66)
Compatibility Indexjt  1:73 ( 2:79; 0:75)
Lagged MP3 Player Pricet 0:03 (0:02; 0:03)
 7:51 (7:02; 7:99)
 re 14:75
 (14:55; 14:94)
Log Marginal Likelihood  1148:05
The estimates yield several insights into the observed bidding strategy. First, the bidders state
variable (dt 1j ) is negatively correlated with its bid amount b
t
j because the ranking of the auction
is determined by the product of btj and d
t 1
j . All else equal, a higher number of lagged downloads
means a bidder can bid less to obtain the same slot. Second, the total number of lagged downloads
in the previous period (
P
j0 d
t 1
j0 ) and the lagged number of bidders both have positive impact on
a bidders bid. We take this to mean increased competition leads to higher bids. Third, bids are
increasing in the product price. One possible explanation is that a high priced product yields more
value to the rm for each download and hence the rm competes more aggressively for a top slot.
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Similarly and fourth, a high price for MP3 players reects greater value for the downloads also
leading to a positive e¤ect on bids. Fifth, Lapse Since Last Updatehas a negative e¤ect on bids.
Older products are more likely obsolete, thereby generating lower value for consumers. If this is
the case, rms can reasonably expect fewer nal purchases after downloads and bid less for these
products. Likewise and sixth, higher compatibility with prior software versions reects product age
leading to a negative estimate for this variable. Finally, ratings from consumers and experts (albeit
not signicant for experts) have a positive correlation with bid amounts these again imply greater
consumer value for the goods making it more protable to advertise them.
5.1.2 Consumer Model
The consumer model is estimated using MCMC approach based on the posterior distribution de-
scribed in Appendix A.1.2. We consider the download decisions for each of the 21 products who
entered auctions plus the top 3 products who did not. Together these rms constitute over 80% of
all downloads. The remaining number of downloads are scattered across 370 other rms, each of
whom has negligible share. Hence we exclude them from our analysis.
Table 5: Alternative Numbers of Latent Segments
Log Marginal Likelihood
1 Segment  12769:3
2 Segments  12511:9
3 Segments  12571:1
4 Segments  12551:4
We calibrate the model by estimating an increasing number of latent segments until there is
no signicant improvement in model t. We use log marginal likelihood as the measurement for
model t. In Table 5 we report the comparison of the log marginal likelihoods for models with up
to 4 segments. The model with 2 segments gives the best result.
Table 6 presents the estimates of the model with 2 segments. Conditional on the estimated
segment parameters and demographic distribution, we calculate the segment sizes as 89:5% and
10:5%, respectively. Based on the parameter estimates in Table 6, Segment 1 is less likely to initiate
a search (low g0). Moreover, upon engaging a search, this segment appears to be less sensitive to
slot ranking but more sensitive to consumer and expert ratings than Segment 2. Segment 2,
who searches more frequently, relies more heavily on the slot order when downloading. Overall,
we speculate that segment 1 are the occasional downloaders who base their download decisions
on others ratings and tend not to exclude goods of high price. In contrast, segment 2 are the
experts,who tend to rely on their own assessments when downloading.
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Table 6: Consumer Model Estimates
Segment 1 (89:5%)
(Infrequent searcher)
Segment 2 (10:5%)
(Frequent searcher and slot sensitive)
Median
(95%Interval)
Median
(95%Interval)
g (utility parameters)
Constant  0:09
( 0:11;0:001)
0:35
(0:31;0:38)
Slot Rank  0:08
( 0:06; 0:09)
 0:51
( 0:52; 0:50)
Non-trial Version Price 0:03
(0:03;0:04)
 0:04
( 0:04; 0:03)
Expert Ratings 0:16
(0:15;0:17)
0:06
(0:06;0:07)
Consumer Ratings 0:11
(0:11;0:12)
0:03
(0:03;0:05)
Compatibility Index  0:08
( 0:09; 0:07)
0:16
(0:16;0:17)
Total Download Percentage 0:01
( 0:02;0:05)
0:09
(0:08;0:10)
g (sorting/ltering scaling) 1:52
(1:48;1:55)
1:87
(1:78;1:99)
g (search probability)
g0 (base)  10:22
( 10:75; 9:60)
 0:78
( 1:21; 0:54)
g1 (1-correlation) 0:02
(0:01;0:02)
0:03
(0:01;0:04)
g (segment parameters)
Constant    4:01
( 4:74; 2:87)
Music Site Visited   7:66
(5:77;10:18)
Registration Status    0:24
( 1:91;0:86)
Product Downloaded
in Last Month
   0:40
( 1:57; 0:02)
29
More insights on this contrast can be gleaned by determining the predicted probabilities of
searching and sorting/ltering by computing Pr(searchgi ) =
exp(g0+
g
1IV
g
it)
1+exp(g0+
g
1IV
g
it)
and Pr()git =
exp(Ugit )
3P
0=0
exp(Ug
0
it )
in equation 9 and 7, respectively. Table 7 reports these probabilities for both segments.
Table 7: Searching Behavior of Consumers
Segment 1 Segment 2
Searching 0:4% 60:8%
No sorting or ltering 78:7% 86:1%
Sorting but no ltering 21:3% 8:2%
No sorting but ltering ! 0 5:5%
Sorting and ltering ! 0 0:3%
Table 7 conrms the tendency of Segment 2 to be more likely to initiate a search in the focal
category. Though comprising only 10:5% of all consumers, they represent 95% of all searches. The
increased searching frequency suggests that members of Segment 2 are ideal customers to target
because more searches lead to more downloads.
Moreover, Segment 2 is more likely to be inuenced by sponsored advertising. To see this, note
that Segment 1 consumers put more weights on ratings of products (e.g., expert and consumer
ratings) than Segment 2 consumers do. As a consequence Segment 1 consumers engage in far more
sorting. Sorting eliminates the advantage conferred by sponsored advertising because winners of
the sponsored search auction may be sorted out of desirable slots on the page.
However, Table 7 indicates consumers in Segment 1 seldom lter. Filtering occurs when con-
sumers seek to exclude negative utility options from the choice set. Given the high sensitivity to
rank order, Segment 2 is more prone to eliminate options. We suspect this segment, by virtue of
being a frequent visitor, searches for very specic products that conform to a particular need. This
also increases the chance a sponsored link will be ltered. Overall, however, Segment 1 is more
likely to sort and/or lter than Segment 2 (21:3% vs. 13:9%) suggesting that Segment 2 is more
valuable to advertisers. We will explore this conjecture in more detail in our policy analysis.
5.2 Second Step Estimation Results
Table 8 shows the results of second step estimation.24 We nd that newer, more expensive and
better rated products yield greater values to the advertiser. This is consistent with our conjecture
in Section 5.1.1 that rms bid more aggressively when having higher values for downloads. We
nd that, after controlling for observed product characteristics, 95% of the variation in valuations
24We do not estimate the discount factor . As shown in Rust (1994), the discount factor is usually unidentied.
We x  = 0:95 for our estimation. We also experiment  = 0:90 and see minimal di¤erence in the results.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Values per Download
across rms is on the order of $0:02. We attribute this variation in part due to di¤erences in the
operating e¢ ciency of the rms.
Table 8: Value per Click Parameter Estimates
Median 95% Interval

Constant 5:55 (3:02; 6:34)
Lapse Since Last Updatejt  0:74 ( 0:84; 0:59)
Non-trial Version Pricejt 0:24 (0:15; 0:39)
Expert Ratingsjt 0:50 (0:27; 0:59)
Consumer Ratingsjt 1:23 (1:10; 1:41)
Compatibility Indexjt  0:31 ( 0:43; 0:21)
Lagged MP3 Player Pricet 0:03 (0:02; 0:04)
 1, random e¤ect std. dev. 0:75
 (0:04; 1:89)
 2, random shock std. dev. 0:45
 (0:03; 0:99)
Log Marginal Likelihood  1683:41
Given the second step results, we can further estimate the value of a download to a rm. We
estimate the advertisers value for a download in each period. The distribution of these estimates
across time and advertisers is depicted in Figure 5. As indicated in the gure there is substantial
variation in the valuation of downloads. Table 8 explains some of this variation as a function of the
characteristics of the software and rm specic e¤ects. Overall, the mean value of a download to
these advertisers is $0:24. This compares to an average bid of $0:20 as indicated in Table 1. Hence,
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on average, each click implies an expected return to a rm of about $0:04: To our knowledge, this is
the rst paper to impute the advertisers return from a click in a key word search context. One way
to interpret these results is to consider the rms expected sales per download to rationalize the bid.
The rms prot per click is roughly CRtj P tj btj ; where CRtj indicates the download-sale conversion
rate (or sales per download) and P tj is the non-trial version price. Ignoring dynamic e¤ects and
setting this prot per click equal to vtj   btj yields a rough approximation of the conversion rate as
CRtj = v
t
j=P
t
j . Viewed in this light, the e¤ect of higher quality software, which raises v
t
j , leads to a
higher implied conversion rate.25 Noting that the average price of the software is $22, this average
per-click valuation implies that 1.1% of all clicks lead to a purchase (that is, the conversion rate is
0:24=22 = 1:1%). This estimate lies within the industry average conversion rate of 1  2% reported
by Gamedaily.com, suggesting our ndings have high face validity.26
6 Policy Simulations
We describe four policy simulations: i) the value of disaggregate consumer data, ii) the value of
targeting (i.e., not only allowing advertisers to bid on keywords but also on market segments.) iii)
the e¤ect of alternative pricing mechanisms on search engine revenue and iv) the e¤ect of alternative
webpage designs on search engine revenues.27 Details regarding the implementation of the policy
simulations are presented in Appendix C. Hence,we limit our discussion to the objectives and
insights from these simulations.
6.1 Policy Simulation I: Incorporating Disaggregate-level Data
Advertisers and search engines are endowed with di¤erent levels of information. The search engine
know all of the clicks made by visitors to its site. The advertiser knows only the total number
of downloads all the advertisers received. Hence, there is an information asymmetry arising from
the di¤erent level of market intelligence accruing to each respective agent. Given this disaggregate
consumer information is owned by the search engine but not observed by advertisers, it is relevant to
ask how the information revelation from the platform to advertisers will a¤ect advertiser behavior
and hence platform revenues. In practice, this means that the platform is interested in whether
to sell or give this information to advertisers and how it should be priced. More generally, this
25Note we do not model the equilibrium pricing strategy of the rms. We conjecture that this pricing game is
played across multiple markets and media as well as over a longer time horizon. The characteristics of the key word
advertising problem likely have only a small e¤ect on prices set by rms. Our treatment of prices as exogenous is
consistent with all the prior research in key word search.
26Casual Free to Pay Conversion Rate Too Low. Gamedaily.com (http://www.gamedaily.com/articles/
features/magid-casual-free-to-pay-conversion-rate-too-low/70943/?biz=1).
27These policy simulations may involve explicitly solving the dynamic programming problem for advertisers. This
is because the environment variables such as auction rules have been changed, which makes the estimated bidding
policy function become inapplicable. The advance in research on approximate dynamic programming makes solving
high-dimension DP problems become possible (Powell (2007)).
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counterfactual exemplied the value of market intelligence and how it can be computed in the
context of a structural model.
Accordingly, we implement a counterfactual scenario under which advertisers have access to the
click histories of consumers. We then assess i) how bidding behavior and returns to advertisers
change under this counterfactual information structure and ii) how the resulting revenues change
at the search engine. By comparing these returns with those in the observed case of information
asymmetry, we can obtain a measure for the value of the information. This value leads to managerial
prescriptions for the search engine regarding the pricing strategy of such information.
6.2 Policy Simulation II: Segmentation and Targeting
It can be protable for advertisers to target specic consumers. In this instance, instead of a single
bid on a key word, an advertiser can vary its bids across market segments. For example, consider
two segments A and B wherein segment B is more sensitive to product price and segment A is more
sensitive to product quality. Consider further, two rms X and Y where rm X purveys a lower
price, but lower quality, product. Intuitively, rm X should bid more aggressively for segment B
because quality sensitive segment A will not likely buy the low quality good X. This should lead to
higher revenues for the search engine. On the other hand, there is less bidding competition for rm
X within segment B because Y nds this segment unattractive this dearth of competition can
drive the bid of X down for segment B. This would place a downward pressure on search engine
prots. Hence, the optimal revenue outcome for the search engine is likely to be incumbent upon
the distribution of consumer preferences and the characteristics of the goods being advertised. Our
approach can assess these e¤ects of segmentation and targeting strategy on the search engines
revenue.
6.3 Policy Simulation III: Alternative Auction Mechanisms
Auction mechanism design has established a rich literature body since the study by Vickrey (1961).
With the purpose of revenue maximization,28 the optimal design involves several aspects such as
the determination of payments and winners as well as the choice of reserve price. We will focus on
the payment rule in this investigation.
While the focal search engine currently charges winning advertisers their own bids, many major
search engines such as Google and Yahoo! are applying a generalized second-price auction as
termed in Edelman et al. (2007). Under the generalized second-price auction rules, winners are
still determined by the ranking of fbtj0dt 1j0 g8j0 . However, instead of paying its own bid amount,
28Sometimes e¢ ciency of allocation is also an objective of the auction design. An e¢ cient auction mechanism
enables the bidder with the highest value to win the best slot, the second value bidder to get the second best slot and
so on. While most search engines are prot-seeking rms, we will only focus on the revenue maximization objective.
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the winner of a slot pays the highest losing bidders bid adjusted by their last period downloads.29
For example, suppose bidder j wins a slot with the bid of btj and last period download d
t 1
j ; its
payment for each download will be btj0d
t 1
j0 =d
t 1
j , where j
0 is the highest losing bidders for the slot
bidder j wins.
In the context of sponsored search auctions, although generalized second-price auction is
widely adopted by major search engines, the optimality of such a mechanism is not conrmed
(Iyengar and Kumar (2006); Katona (2007)). With the estimates from the model, we are able to
implement a policy simulation by altering the payment rule of the game and compare the revenues of
the search engine under the two di¤erent mechanisms. We intend to gain some empirical knowledge
about the auction mechanism design in sponsored search auctions, which will also shed insights into
future theoretical investigations.
6.4 Policy Simulation IV: Alternative Webpage Design
The goal of the search engines sorting/ltering options is to provide consumers with easier access
to price and rating information across di¤erent products. As shown in section 3.1 and evidenced
by our results, sorting and ltering play a crucial role in consumer decision process. In light of this
outcome, it is possible to consider an alternative webpage design of the search engine eliminating
the option of sorting and ltering for consumers and assessing the resulting impact on consumer
search, advertiser bidding, and the search engines revenues. As we note below, the sorting and
ltering options can have conicting outcomes on the nature of competition and therefore advertiser
bidding behavior.
One view is that sorting increases competition by making products more substitutable. Alba
et al. (1997) hence express the concern faced by many online retailers: since online shopping reduces
search costs, consumers increase their consideration sets which intensies competition. Diehl et al.
(2003) show that, based on a consumers keyword query, search engines oversample products that
match the consumers interests; these sampled products are more likely to be close substitutes.
Thus, there will be less product di¤erentiation and more intensied competition. An implication
for sponsored search advertising is that advertisers would bid more aggressively in the auctions to
secure premium slots in order to di¤erentiate their goods.
An alternative view, espoused by Lynch and Ariely (2000), proposes that sorting may actually
decrease competition. Search engines not only lead to lower search costs, but they can also make
quality information more salient. When making decisions, consumers place greater weight on
attributes that are more convenient to process (cf. Russo (1977); Häubl and Murray (2003)).
In our case, the consumer and expert ratings become more prominent to consumers. Thus, when
consumers have the easier access to rating information, the product quality becomes more important
to consumers and advertisers may have less incentive to bid.
29 In the paper by Edelman et al. (2007), the adjustment using last period downloads is not considered.
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Using our model, it can be tested which e¤ect may have a greater impact on consumer behavior
and therefore the advertisersbidding incentives. Using our integrated approach to assessing ad-
vertiser and consumer behavior, we can further impute the consequences of a change in web page
design on search engine revenues.
7 Conclusion
Given the $9B rms annually spend on key word advertising and its rapid growth, we contend that
the topic is of central concern to advertisers and platforms that host advertising alike. In light of
this growth, it is surprising that there is little extant empirical research pertaining to modeling
the demand and pricing for key word advertising. As a result, we develop a dynamic structural
model of advertiser bidding behavior coupled with an attendant model of search behavior. The
interplay of these two agents has a number of implications for the platform that hosts them. The
model is dynamic because past clicks on the advertisers links a¤ect the search engines current
allocation of advertising slots. We adopt a structural approach in order to simulate the e¤ect
of various changes in the search engines policy. In particular, we consider i) how the platform
or search engine should price its advertising via alternative auction mechanisms, ii) whether the
platform should accommodate targeted bidding wherein advertisers bid not only on key words, but
also behavioral segments (e.g., those that purchase more often), iii) whether and how the search
engine should sell information on individual clicking histories and iv) how an alternative webpage
design of the search engine with less product information would a¤ect bidding behavior and the
engines revenues.
Our model of bidding behavior is predicated on the advertiser choosing its bids to maximize
the net present value of its discounted prots. The period prots contain two components  i)
the advertisers value for a given click times the number of clicks on the advertisement and ii) the
payment in form of the bid per click times the number of clicks on the advertisement. Whereas
the advertisers costs are determined by their bids, we infer the advertisers valuation for clicks.
Specically, we estimate valuations by choosing them such that, for an observed set of bids, the
valuations rationalize the bidding strategy; that is, making prots as high as possible. In this sense,
our structural model backs out the advertisers expectation for the prot per click. Given an
estimate of these valuations, it becomes possible to ascertain how advertiser prots are a¤ected by
a change in the rules of the auction, a change in the webpage design, or a change in the information
state of the advertiser. As noted above, another central component to the calculation of advertiser
prots is the expectation of the number of clicks on its advertisement received from consumers.
This expectation of clicks is imputed from our consumer model.
Our consumer choice model follows from the standard random utility theory (McFadden (1977))
and is computed using traditional MCMC methods adapted to our context. The advertiser model
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is less straightforward because it is a dynamic program. We use recent advances in economics
wherein a two-step estimator is applied to the problem (BBL). The rst step is used to infer the
bidding policy and consumer clicking behavior. The second step is used to infer the advertiser
valuations conditioned on the bidding strategy and the consumer clicking decisions. Our approach
departs from previous work on two-step estimators via our Bayesian instantiation. Like all MCMC
approaches, this innovation enables one to estimate a broader set of models and does not rely on
asymptotic for inference (Rossi et al. (2005)).
The estimates from our empirical model yield some insights into advertiser bidding behavior
and consumer searching behavior. The estimates from advertiser bidding function indicates that
bid amounts have positive correlations with product attributes that may enhance product quality.
One possible explanation is that a higher quality leads to the advertisers greater valuation about
sponsored search advertising and hence the more aggressive bidding. Our consumer model indicates
that consumers who engage in more search and clicking may also be more responsive to sponsored
advertising than others. If so, these consumers should be the focus of advertisers and search engines
marketing campaigns.
Further policy insights will be drawn from the ongoing policy simulations.
Several extensions are possible. First, we use a two-step estimator to model the dynamic bidding
behavior of advertisers without explicitly solving for the equilibrium bidding strategy. Solving
explicitly for this strategy could provide more insights into bidder behavior in this new marketing
phenomenon. For example, following the extant literature we assume that a bidders return of
the advertising only comes from consumers clicks. It is possible that advertisers also accrue some
values from the exposures at the premium slots. A clear characterization of bidding strategy can
better facilitate our understanding about how advertisers value sponsored advertising in term of
clicks and exposures and hence present a better guideline for search engines to design their pricing
schedule. Second, our analysis focuses upon a single category. Bidding across multiple keywords
is an important direction for future research. In particular, the existence of multiple keywords
auctions may present opportunities for collusions among bidders. For example, advertisers may
collusively diverge their bids to di¤erent keywords. By doing so, they can nd a more protable
trade-o¤between payments to the search engine and clicks across keywords. In a theoretical paper by
Stryszowska (2005) the author shows an equilibrium where bidders implicitly collude across multiple
auctions in the context of online auctions such as eBay.com. One managerial implication is how to
detect and discourage collusions and reduce its negative impact on search engine revenues. Third,
competition between search engines over advertisers is not modeled. Though our data provider has
a dominant role in this specic category, inter-engine competition is unattended in the literature.
To some extent, sponsored search advertising can be understood as advertisers purchasing products
(media) from search engines through auctions. An advertiser makes discrete choice about search
engines before entering auctions. Little research has been done on the advertisers choice problem,
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even though there is abundant discrete choice research that can be applied (cf. Palma et al. (1992)).
Accordingly, the inter-engine competition deserves future attention. Overall, we hope this study
will inspire further work to enrich our knowledge of this new marketplace.
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Appendix
A Two Step Estimator
A.1 First Step Estimation
A.1.1 Estimating the Advertisers Policy Function
The Partial Policy Function The partial policy function links states (s) and characteristics
(X) to decisions (b). Ideally this relation can be captured by a relatively exible parametric form
and estimated via methods such as maximum likelihood or MCMC to obtain the partial policy
function parameter estimates. The exact functional form is typically determined by model t
comparison among multiple specications (e.g., Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003)). We consid-
ered several di¤erent specications for the distribution of bids and found the truncated normal
distribution gives the best t in terms of marginal likelihoods.30 Specically, we allow
btj =
(
ytj
0
if ytj  
otherwise
(A1)
ytj  N([st0;Xt0j ]  '+ 'rej ; 2)
'rej  N(0; 2re)
where [st0;Xt0j ] is the vector of independent variables;  is the standard deviation of y

jt; '
re
j is a
bidder specic random e¤ect whose distribution is N(0; 2re);  is the truncation point, which is set
at 15 to be consistent with the 15c/ minimum bid requirement of the search engine.
One possible concern when estimating the partial policy function e (s;X) (and the full policy
function  (s;X; Rj) next) is that there may be multiple equilibrium strategies; and the observed
data are generated by multiple equilibria. If this were the case, the policy function would not lead
to a unique decision and would be of limited use in predicting advertiser behavior. It is therefore
necessary to invoke the following assumption (BBL).
Assumption 2 (Equilibrium Selection): The data are generated by a single Markov perfect
equilibrium prole .
Assumption 2 is relatively unrestrictive since our data is generated by auctions of one keyword and
from one search engine. Given data are from a single market, the likelihood is diminished that
di¤erent equilibria from di¤erent markets are confounded. We note that this assumption is often
employed in such contexts (e.g., Dubé et al. (2008)).
30We experimented alternative specications including a Beta distribution and a Weibull distribution whose scale,
shape and location parameters are functions of (s;X). The current specication gives the best t in terms of marginal
likelihoods.
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This partial policy function is then used to impute the full policy function bj = j (s;X; Rj) as
detailed below based on Rjs distribution parameters  0 = ( 1;  2).
Full Policy Functions tj

st;Xt;Rtj

To evaluate the value function of this dynamic game, we
need to calculate bids as a function of not only (st;Xt) but also the unobserved shocks Rtj = rj+r
t
j
(see section 3.2.3). To infer this full policy function j

st;Xt;Rtj

from the estimated partial policy
function, ej(st;Xt), we introduce two additional assumptions.
Assumption 3 (Monotone Choice): For each bidder j, its equilibrium strategy j

st;Xt;Rtj

is
increasing in Rtj (BBL).
Assumption 3 implies that bidders who draw higher private valuation shocks Rtj will bid more
aggressively.
Assumption 4: The ratio of standard deviations of rj and rtj equals to the ratio of  re and  , the
standard deviations of random e¤ects and shocks in the partial policy function.
Assumption 4 implies that the bidders latent variable ytj are a¤ected proportionally by rj and r
t
j
in terms of magnitude.
To explore these two assumptions, note that the partial policy function e  st;Xt presents dis-
tributions for bid btj and the latent y
t
j , whose CDFs we denote as Fb

btj jst;Xt

and F

ytj jst;Xt

,
respectively.31 According to the model in equation A1, the population mean of ytj across bidders
and periods is [st;Xtj ] '. Around this mean, the variation across bidders and periods can be decom-
posed into two parts: the one that varies across both bidders and periods and the one only varies
across bidders. The former is captured by the variance term 2 and the latter is represented by
the random e¤ect variance 2re. With the assumptions 3 and 4, we can attribute 
2 to the random
shocks rtj that vary across both bidders and periods and 
2
re to rj that only vary across bidders.
Given the normal distribution assumption of the random shock Rtj = rj + r
t
j  N
 
0;  21 +  
2
2

,
we may impute the ytj (and hence b
t
j) for each combination of

st;Xt;Rtj

, i.e., the full policy
function. To see this, note that since j

st;Xt;Rtj

is increasing in Rtj ,
32
F
 
ytj jst;Xt

= Pr
 
j
 
st;Xt;Rtj
  ytj jst;Xt =  1j  ytj ; st;Xt =q 21 +  22
31To be more specic, we estimate a continuous distribution F
 
ytj jst;Xt

for ytj from equation A1; then condi-
tional on the trunction point , we can back out the (discontinuous) distribution Fb
 
btj jst;Xt

for btj .
32 In this Appendix, we are abusing the notation of j
 
st;Xt;Rtj

. For the purpose of a clear exposition, we
dene j
 
st;Xt;Rtj

= btj in the paper. To match the bidding function estimated in equation A1, the more accurate
denition should be
btj =

ytj
0
if ytj  
otherwise
ytj = j
 
st;Xt;Rtj

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where  1j

ytj ; s
t;Xt

is the inverse function of j

st;Xt;Rtj

with respect to Rtj and () is
the CDF of standard normal distribution. In equilibrium, we have j

st;Xt;Rtj

= ytj . By
substitution and rearrangement we get
ytj = j
 
st;Xt;Rtj

(A2)
= F 1



 1j
 
ytj ; s
t;Xt

=
q
 21 +  
2
2

jst;Xt

= F 1



Rtj=
q
 21 +  
2
2

jst;Xt

= F 1


 eRtj=p1 + 2=2re jst;Xt
where  1j

ytj ; s
t;Xt

= Rtj ; R
t
j=
q
 21 +  
2
2 has a standard normal distribution.
Therefore there is a unique mapping between the likelihood of observing a given valuation
shock Rtj and the y
t
j . Each R
t
j drawn by a rm implies a corresponding quantile on the R
t
js
distribution; this quantile in turn implies a ytj from the distribution represented by that rms
partial bidding function ej(st; Xt). However, because we do not know  1 and  2 and thus the
distribution of Rtj , we have to make draws from an alternative distribution eRtj = erj + ertj that has
a one-one quantile mapping to Rtj . To do this, we rst draw the random e¤ect erj from N(0; 1)
and keep it xed for bidder j across periods. Next for period t, we draw a random shock ertj from
some scaled normal distribution. To construct a proper one-one mapping of quantiles between
the two distribution of Rtj and eRtj , we need to make sure that the distribution of ertj is properly
scaled so that var(ertj)=var(erj) = var(rtj)=var(rj) =  22= 21. Because of assumption 4, we know
that  22= 
2
1 = 
2=2re. Hence we should draw ertj  N(0; 2=2re). Note that now eRtj = erj + ertj is
following a distribution N(0; 1 + 2=2re). Therefore eRtj=p1 + 2=2re has the same distribution of
N (0; 1) as Rtj=
q
 21 +  
2
2. Further, eRtj is properly scaled such that the quantiles of eRtj and Rtj
are uniquely mapped. We then compute the likelihood of eRtj=p1 + 2=2re as ( eRtj=p1 + 2=2re):
Next, we determine F

ytj jst;Xt

using results estimated in A1 and looking at the distribution
of its residuals to determine F . That is, for each value of ytj we should be able to compute its
probability for a given st and Xt using F . Accordingly, F 1 links probabilities to ytj (therefore
btj) for a given s
t and Xt. We then use F 1 to link the probability ( eRtj=p1 + 2=2re) to btj for a
particular st and Xt. In this manner we ensure the bids and valuations in equation (A11) comport.
In Appendix A.2.1, when evaluating the value function for a set of given parameter values of  1
and  2 in equation A11 or evaluating base functions dened in A12, we integrate out over the
unobserved shocks Rtj by drawing many erj and ertj from N(0; 1) and N(0; 2=2re), respectively.
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A.1.2 Consumer Model Estimation
We derive the consumer model conditioned on the information state of the advertiser as described
in section 3.1. Given advertisers do not observe what each person downloaded or the characteristics
of these persons, it must infer consumer behavior from aggregate instead of individual level data.
Advertisers do observe the aggregate data in the form of download counts dt = fdt1; dt2; :::; dtNg
in period t. A single dtj follow a binomial distribution. Given the individual level download proba-
bilities Pijt in equation 12, a single dtjs probability mass function is
 
Mt
dtj
!
[Pijt]
dtj [1 Pijt]Mt dtj ;
where Mt is the consumer population size in period t. Hence the likelihood of observing dt is
L(dtj
c) =
Y
j
 
Mt
dtj
!
[Pijt]
dtj [1  Pijt]Mt dtj
where 
c  fg;g; g; g; g0; g1gg are parameters to be estimated.
Naturally, the full posterior distribution of the model will be the product of L(dtj
c) across
periods and p(
c), the prior distributions of parameters, i.e.,
p(
cjdata) /
Y
t
L(dtj
c)  p(
c) (A3)
An advertisers predicted downloads d(k;Xtj ; 
c) can readily be constructed using the parameter
estimates as shown in equation 13
d(k;Xtj ; b
c) =Mt bPijt (A4)
This prediction is then used to forecast expectations of future downloads and slot positions in the
rms value function in the second step estimation.
A.1.3 State Transition Function P

s
0 jbj ;b j ; s;X

To compute the state transition, note that the marginal number of expected downloads is given by
the expected downloads given a slot position multiplied by the probability of appearing in that slot
position and then summed across all positions:
P

s
0 jbj ;b j ; s;X

=
X
k
d(k;X; 
c) Pr (kjbj ;b j ; s;X) (A5)
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The expected downloads given a slot position in A5 is dened in 13. We can decompose the
likelihood of appearing in slot k as follows
Pr(kjbj ;b j ; s;X) (A6)
= PrfkKg (kjbj ;b j ; s;X) Ifk  Kg+ Prfk>Kg(kjbj ;b j ; s;X)Ifk > Kg
where PrfkKg (kjbj ;b j ; s;X) is the probability of appearing in slot k of the sponsored search
section (i.e., k  K); and Prfk>Kg(kjbj ;b j ; s;X) is the likelihood of appearing in slot k of the
organic search section (i.e., k > K). We discuss these two probabilities next.
Likelihood of Premium Slot k  K Let us rst consider the likelihood of winning one of
the premium slots k (k  K), PrfkKg (kjbj ;b j ; s;X) as an order statistic reecting the relative
quality of the advertisers bid, which is dened as bjd
( 1)
j . Higher quality bids are more likely to be
assigned to better slots. Denote 	bd(bj0d
( 1)
j0 js;X) as the distribution CDF of bj0d( 1)j0 ,8j0, where
d
( 1)
j0 is from the state vector and bj0 has a distribution depending on the strategy prole  ().33
For bidder j to win a premium slot k by bidding bj , it implies that (1) among all of the other N  1
competing bidders, there are k 1 bidders have a higher ranking than j in terms of bj0d( 1)j0 and (2)
the other ones have a lower ranking than j. The probability of having a higher ranking than j is
[1 	bd(bjd( 1)j js;X)]. Thus the probability of bidder j winning slot k by bidding bj is simply an
order statistics as shown below; note that the combination
 
N   1
k   1
!
in the equation is because
any (k   1) out of the (N   1) competing bidders can have a higher ranking than j.34
PrfkKg (kjbj ;b j ; s;X) (A7)
=
 
N   1
k   1
!
[1 	bd(bjd( 1)j js;X)]k 1[	bd(bjd( 1)j js;X)](N 1) (k 1)
=
 
N   1
k   1
!
[1 	bd(bjd( 1)j js;X)]k 1[	bd(bjd( 1)j js;X)]N k
Likelihood of Organic Slot k > K Next we consider what happens when an advertiser does
not win this auction and is placed in the organic search section. In this case, by the rules of the
auction, the bidders slot is determined by its update recency compared to all products in the
organic search section. For bidder j to be placed in organic slot k > K it implies that (1) there are
33 It is di¢ cult to write a closed form solution for 	bd but we may use the sample population distribution to
approximate 	bd.
34An alternative interpretation of equation A7 is the probability mass function (PMF) of a binomial distribution.
Among N   1 competing bidders, there are k   1 higher than bidder j and (N   1)  (k   1) lower than j; and the
probability of higher than j is [1 	bd(bjd( 1)j js;X)]. Hence we may consider the expression in A7 as the PMF of a
binomial distribution.
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K bidders have a higher ranking of bj0d
( 1)
j0 than bidder j (i.e., j loses the auction) and (2) among
the other N  K   1 products (i.e., all products at the search engine less those who win premium
slots and j itself), there are k  K   1 products have a higher update recency than j and (3) the
other ones have a lower ranking than j. Hence,
Prfk>Kg(kjbj ;b j ; s;X)
= Pr(k > Kjbj ;b j ; s;X)  Pr(kjbj ;b j ; s;X; k > K) (A8)
where the rst term is the probability of losing the auction (condition 1) and the second term
denotes the likelihood of appearing in position k > K (condition 2 and 3). Note that the main
reason for the di¤erence between A7 and A8 is the change of ranking mechanisms. The ranking
is based on bj0d
( 1)
j0 for k  K and update recency when k > K. The rst term in A8 does not
appear as an order statistics (as shown below) since when k > K the order of bj0d
( 1)
j0 becomes
meaningless. Instead, the update recency is a¤ecting the ranking. The two terms in A8 can be
expressed as follows.
Losing the auction implies that among js N   1 opponents, there are K bidders have a higher
ranking than j in terms of bj0d
( 1)
j0 . Hence,
Pr(k > Kjbj ;b j ; s;X) =
 
N   1
K
!
[1 	bd(bjd( 1)j js;X)]K (A9)
The conditional probability of being placed in an organic slot k > K (condition 2 and 3) is again
an order statistics.35 This distribution is incumbent upon the update recency of all N products
exclusive of the K winners in the sponsored search section. Denoting the distribution of update
recency of all products as 	up, which can be approximated from the sample population distribution
observed in the data, we obtain the following:
Pr(kjbj ;b j ; s;X; k > K) (A10)
=
 
N  K   1
k  K   1
!
[1 	up]k K 1[	up](N K 1) (k K 1)
=
 
N  K   1
k  K   1
!
[1 	up]k K 1[	up]N k
Combining A10 and A9 into A8, and then A8 and A7 into A6 yields the state transition equation.
Given that we have detailed the estimation of the rst step functions (j (s;X; Rj), d(k;Xtj ; 
c);
P (s0jb; s;X)), we now turn to the second step estimator, which is incumbent upon these rst step
functions.
35This order statistics can again be interpreted as the PMF of a binomial distribution similar to A7.
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A.2 Second Step Estimation of Bidder Model
In this Appendix we detail how to estimate the parameters in the value function. This is done in
two phases; rst we simulate the value function conditioned on 
a and second we construct the
likelihood using the simulated value function conditioned on 
a:
A.2.1 Phase 1: Simulation of Value Functions Given 
a
To construct the value function we rst simplify its computation by linearization and, second, using
this simplication we simulate the expected value function conditioned on 
a by integrating out
over draws for st, Xt, and (erj + ertj):
Linearize the Value Function We simplify the estimation procedure by relying on the fact
that equation 16 is linear in the parameters 
a. We can rewrite equation 16 by factoring out 
a.
Ej
 
bt; st;Xt; Rtj ; 

(A11)
=
XK
k=1
Pr
 
kjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt
  (v(Xtj ; ) + rj + rtj   btj)  d(k;Xtj ; 
c)
+
XN
k=K+1
Pr
 
kjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt
  (v(Xtj ; ) + rj + rtj)  d(k;Xtj ; 
c)
=
XN
k=1
Pr
 
kjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt
  d(k;Xtj ; 
c) Xtj  
+
XN
k=1
Pr
 
kjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt
  d(k;Xtj ; 
c)  erj   1
+
XN
k=1
Pr
 
kjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt
  d(k;Xtj ; 
c)  ertj   2
 btj
XK
k=1
Pr
 
kjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt

d(k;Xtj ; 
c)
= Basetj1 +Base
t
j2  Basetj3
where
Basetj1 
XN
k=1
Pr
 
kjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt
  d(k;Xtj ; 
c) Xtj (A12)
Basetj2 
24 PNk=1 Prkjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt  d(k;Xtj ; 
c)  erjPN
k=1 Pr

kjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt

 d(k;Xtj ; 
c)  ertj
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Basetj3  btj
XK
k=1
Pr
 
kjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt

d(k;Xtj ; 
c)erj  N(0; 1) ertj  N(0; 2=2re)
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Note that the values of
n
Basetj1; Base
t
j2; Base
t
j3
o
8t
are conditionally independent of  and  .
This enables us to rst evaluate
n
Basetj1; Base
t
j2; Base
t
j3
o
8t
and keep them constant when drawing
 and  from their posterior distributions. By doing so, we reduce the computational burden of
estimation as described next.
Simulate the Value Functions Given 
a After the linearization, given a set of advertiser
parameters 
a = f;  1;  2g and equation A11, the value function depicted in equation 18 can also
be written as the following with period index t invoked:
Vj
 
s0;X0;; 
a

= Es;X;R
" 1X
t=0
tj
 
; st;Xt; Rtj ; 
a
#
(A13)
= E[
1X
t=0
(tBasetj1 +Base
t
j2  Basetj3)]
= [E
1X
t=0
tBasetj1] + [E
1X
t=0
tBasetj2]   [E
1X
t=0
tBasetj3]
where the expectation is taken over current and future private shocks, future states st, future Xt
and Rt.
An estimated value function bVj  s0;X0;; 
a can then be obtained by the following steps:
1. Draw erj from N(0; 1) for all bidder j and keep erj xed for all periods;
2. Draw private shocks ertj from N(0; 2=2re) for all bidders j in period 0; draw initial choice of
s0 from the distribution of state variables derived from the observed data; draw X0 from the
observed distribution of product attributes.
3. Starting with the initial state s0, X0 and the (erj + er0j ) from step 1-2, calculate bb0j for all
bidders using the inversion (equation A2) described in Appendix A.1.1.
4. Use s0, X0 and bb0 to determine the slot ranking, whose distribution is Prkjbtj ;bt j ; st;Xt
in equation A6 in Appendix A.1.3; using d(k;X0j ; 
c) in equation (13), obtain a new state
vector s1, whose distribution is P (s1jbb0; s0;X0) in equation A5 in Appendix A.1.3; draw X1
from the observed distribution of product attributes.
5. Repeat step 2-4 for T periods for all bidders to compute all st, Xt, (erj + ertj)8j , and bt for all
periods; T is large enough so that the discount factor T approaches 0.
6. Using st, Xt, (erj + ertj)8j , d(k;Xtj ; 
c) and bt, evaluate nBasetj1; Basetj2; Basetj3o
t=0;:::;T
and
[
TP
t=0
tBasetj1]; [
TP
t=0
tBasetj2]; [
TP
t=0
tBasetj3]

:
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7. The resulting values of 
Basetj1; Base
t
j2; Base
t
j3
	
t=0;:::;T
and (
[
TX
t=0
tBasetj1]; [
TX
t=0
tBasetj2]; [
TX
t=0
tBasetj3]
)
depend on the random draws of st;Xt; Rt. To compute(
[E
1X
t=0
tBasetj1]; [E
1X
t=0
tBasetj2]; [E
1X
t=0
tBasetj3]
)
;
repeat step 1-6 for NR times so as to integrate out over the draws. Note that when T is large
enough [E
TP
t=0
tBasetj] is a good approximation of [E
1P
t=0
tBasetj] since 
T approaches 0.
8. Conditional on a set of parameters 
a = f;  0g and(
[E
1X
t=0
tBasetj1]; [E
1X
t=0
tBasetj2]; [E
1X
t=0
tBasetj3]
)
;
we may evaluate bVj  s0;X0;; 
a from (A13).
An estimated deviation value function bVj s0;X0;0j ; j ; 
a with an alternative strategy 0j
other than j can be constructed by following the same procedure. We draw a deviated strategy
0j by adding disturbance to the estimated policy function from Step 1. In particular, we add a
normally distributed random variable (mean = 0; s:d: = 0:3) to each parameter.
We implement this process by rst drawingNS = 10 initial states for each bidder and fXtgt=0;1;:::;T
of all T = 200 periods. Then for each combination of bidder and initial state, we use this process
to compute the base value functions and ND = 100 perturbed base functions. In Step 6, we use
NR = 100. The discount factor  is xed as 0:95.
The computational burden is reduced tremendously since we have linearized the value functions
and factored out the parameters 
a. We do not need to re-evaluate the value functions for each set
of parameters 
a. Instead, we only evaluate the base functions in equation A12 once using step 1-7
and keep them xed. Then for each draw of 
a from the posterior distribution we may evaluate
the value functions (step 8) so as to recover 
a as described below.
A.2.2 Phase 2: Recover 
a
Recall our goal is to assess the likelihood that 19 holds. Dene Pj

s0(ns);X
0;; 0j ; 
a

as the
probability of the event
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nbVj(s0(ns);X0;j ; j ; 
a)  bVj(s0(ns);X0;0j ; j ; 
a)o ; (A14)
where s0(ns) stands for the ns-th initial state of bidder j. This event means that the estimated
value function for the given initial state s0(ns) with observed strategy j is greater than the es-
timated value function with a deviation 0j . For observed data to be rational, we should have
Pj

s0(ns);X
0;; 0j ; 
a

converging to 1 under the true parameters, in the sense that all ND draws
should result in the event of equation A14.
Note that Pj

s0(ns);X
0;; 0j ; 
a

is not observed but it can be approximated with the sample
analog from the simulated ND draws of bVj(s0(ns); X0;0j ;  j ; 
a) as the follows:
bPj s0(ns);X0;; 0j ; 
a (A15)
=
1
ND
XND
nd=1
I
nbVj(s0(ns);X0;j ; j ; 
a)  bVj(s0(ns);X0;0j ; j ; 
a)(nd)o
where the subscript (nd) indices the nd-th simulated bVj(s0(ns); X0;0j ;  j ; 
a).
By pooling together all bPj s0(ns);X0;; 0j ; 
as across bidders and (ns), we are able to con-
struct the likelihood function as the following
L =
Y
j;(ns)
bPj s0(ns);X0;; 0j ; 
a (A16)
Denote the prior of 
a as p(
a), the posterior can be written as
p(
ajdata) /
Y
j;(ns)
bPj s0(ns);X0;; 0j ; 
a p(
a) (A17)
B Sampling Chain
B.1 Advertiser Model
B.1.1 Priors
The advertiser model is specied as
btj =
(
ytj
0
if ytj  
otherwise
(A18)
ytj  N([st0;Xt0j ]  '+ 'rej ; 2)
'rej  N(0; 2re)
We iterate the sampling chain for 20,000 and use the second half of the chain to make inference.
The priors use a di¤used variance of 100; examinations of the posteriors shows that the choice of
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the variance is the order of magnitude greater than posterior distributions, which assures a proper
but di¤used prior (Spiegelhalter et al. (1996), Gelman et al. (2004)).
Priors Selected Value
' '  N  '0; Id2'
'0: estimates of an classical Tobit model of
bid btj on [s
t0;Xt0j ] with the truncation at 15.
2' = 100
Id is an identity matrix with the dimension of
the number of covariates vector [st0;Xt0j ].
 re  re  TN(0;+1)(1; 21)36 1 = 5; 21 = 100
   TN(0;+1)(2; 22) 2 = 5; 22 = 100
B.1.2 Conditional Posteriors
 To facilitate explication denote the vector [st0;Xt0j ]  Ztj , the matrix [Ztj ]8j;t as Z and the vec-
tor [ytj ]8j;t  y. We also denote the number of bidders as N and the number of observations
for bidder j as Nj . So the total number of observations is
P
j Nj ; the dimension of Z
t
j is 1
by d (the dimension of [st0; Xt0j ]); the dimension of Z is
P
j Nj by d; the dimension of y
 isP
j Nj . The vector of bidder specic random e¤ects, '
re; is a column vector with a length
of
P
j Nj . The '
re is constructed as N stacked sub-vectors, where the j-th sub-vector has
bidder js 'rej as its elements and a dimension of Nj .
 ytj
ytj is determined by the following
ytj = b
t
j ; if b
t
j > 0
ytj  TN( 1;15](Ztj'+ 'rej ; 2); if btj = 0
ytj is right truncated at 15 when b
t
j = 0; this is consistent with the 15c/ minimum bid
requirement of the search engine.
 'rej
36We do not use Gamma distribution as the prior. Natarajan and McCulloch (1998) show a di¤used proper
prior such as Gamma distribution can sometimes lead to inaccurate inference due to the long tail of the Gamma
distribution. In our application, we rst tried Gamma distribution as the prior and got poor quality mixing. There
were some unrealistic large draws for re in the order greater than 100. So we instead adopted the truncated normal
prior.
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'rej s are treated as latent variables. Bidder j has the same '
re
j across all Nj observations.
The conditional likelihood of latent 'rej is
L /
NjQ
exp(  [y
t
j   (Ztj'+ 'rej )]2
22
)
Hence in each iteration we draw 'rej from the following distribution
'rej  N(brej ; brej )brej = (Nj 2 +  2re ) 1brej = brej  2P
t
(ytj   Ztj')
 '
Prior '  N  '0; Id2' (A19)
Likelihood L / Q
j;t
exp(  [y
t
j   (Ztj'+ 'rej )]2
22
)
Posterior ('j)  N(';')
' = [Z
0Z 2 +  2' ]
 1
' = '  f[y   're]0Z 2 + '0 2' g
  re
Prior  re  TN(0;+1)(1; 21)
A random walk proposal density is used in the (r)-th iteration,  (r)re  TN(0;+1)( (r 1)re ; 2p1),
where  (r 1)re is the value from the (r   1)-th iteration; 2p1 is the variance which is tuned so
that the acceptance rate is between 15%  50%.
The acceptance probability pr = min(1; pr) and
pr =
L(
(r)
re j)p( (r)re j1; 21)( (r 1)re j (r)re ; 2p1)
L(
(r 1)
re j)p( (r 1)re j1; 21)( (r)re j (r 1)re ; 2p1)
where p( ()re j1; 21) is the density of  ()re evaluated using the prior. L( ()re j) is the likelihood
evaluated at  ()re . In particular,
L( ()re j) /
Q
j
('rej ; 0; 
()
re )
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where ('rej ; 0; 
()
re ) is the normal density of the random e¤ect 'rej evaluated with mean 0 and
standard deviation  ()re .
(
(r 1)
re j (r)re ;2p1)
(
(r)
re j (r 1)re ;2p1)
is used as a weight to correct the acceptance probability as the proposal density
is truncated at 0 and, hence, asymmetric.
 
Prior   TN(0;+1)(2; 22)
A random walk proposal density is used in the (r)-th iteration,  (r)  TN(0;+1)( (r 1); 2p2),
where  (r 1) is the value from the (r   1)-th iteration; 2p2 is the tuning variance.
The acceptance probability pr = min(1; pr) and
pr =
L( (r)j)p( (r)j2; 22)( (r 1)j (r); 2p2)
L( (r 1)j)p( (r 1)j2; 22)( (r)j (r 1); 2p2)
where p( ()j2; 22) is the density of  () evaluated using the prior. L( ()j) is the likelihood
evaluated at  (). To be specic
L( ()j) /Q
j;t
(ytj ;Z
t
j'+ '
re
j ; 
())
where (ytj ;Z
t
j'+ '
re
j ; 
()) is the normal density of ytj evaluated with mean Z
t
j'+ '
re
j and
standard deviation  ().
B.2 Consumer Model
[To be completed.]
B.3 Second Step Estimation
B.3.1 Priors
Priors Selected Value
   N  0; IX2
0: a vector of zeros with the length of the
number of product attributes.
2 = 100
IX is an identity matrix with the dimension
of the number of product attributes.
   TN(0;+1)( ; I22 ), where  0 = f 1;  2g
0 = f1; 1g; 2 = 100, I2 is an identity
matrix with the dimension of 2.
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B.3.2 Conditional Posteriors
 
Prior   N  0; IX2
A random walk proposal density is used in the (r)-th iteration, (r)  N((r 1); IX2p), where
(r 1) is the value from the (r   1)-th iteration; 2p is a scalar and functions as the tuning
variance.
The acceptance probability pr = min(1; pr) and
pr =
L((r)j)p((r)j0; IX2)
L((r 1)j)p((r 1)j0; IX2)
where p(()j0; IX2) is the density of () evaluated using the prior. L(()j) is the likelihood
evaluated at (). The likelihood is dened in equation A16.
  
  TN(0;+1)( ; I22 )
A random walk proposal density is used in the (r)-th iteration,  (r)  TN(0;+1)( (r 1); I22p ),
where  (r 1) is the value from the (r   1)-th iteration; 2p is a scalar and functions as the
tuning variance.
The acceptance probability pr = min(1; pr) and
pr =
L( (r)j)p( (r)j ; I22 )( (r 1)j (r); 2p )
L( (r 1)j)p( (r 1)j ; I22 )( (r)j (r 1); 2p )
where p( ()j ; I22 ) is the density of  () evaluated using the prior. L( ()j) is the likelihood
evaluated at  (). The likelihood is dened in equation A16. Since the proposal density is
asymmetric, the ratio
( (r 1)j (r);2p )
( (r)j (r 1);2p )
is used to adjust the acceptance probability.
C Policy Simulation Implementation
C.1 Policy Simulation I: Incorporating Disaggregate-level Data
The rst step in our analysis is to consider how the model di¤ers in the presence of complete
information on the part of the advertiser and the second step is to assess how advertiser prots
change in light of complete information.
The consumer model under full information is similar to the one developed under incomplete
information considered in Section 3.1. The main di¤erence is that, in addition to download counts
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dt, advertisers further observe every consumer is download decision on every product j (denoted by
a binary variable yijt), all their sorting/ltering choices it and the individual level demographics,
Demoit. These are often observed across multiple periods.
Accordingly, we begin by amending the model described from Equation 1 to 11 by
(yijtjugijt; git; git) = Ifugijt  0gyijt + Ifugijt < 0g(1  yijt) (A20)
(gitjzgit; git) =
X
n2N
I fgit = ng Ifmaxfzgitg = zgit g (A21)
where N indexes the number of search options (in our case four). The rst equation captures the
download decision and the second the search strategy decision. The new specication of disaggre-
gate consumer model generates an augmented likelihood function of consumer i. Noting that within
each segment, Pr(downloadjsearch strategy; search)  Pr(search strategyjsearch)  Pr(search);
we write
Li(yijt; itj
c) (A22)
=
X
g
f
Y
t
Y
j
[
Z
ugijt
Z
zgit
(yijtjugijt; git; git)(gitjzgit; git)(ugijtj)(zgitj)dugijtdzgit]
Pr(searchgit)gpggit
where 
c  fg; ga; g; g; g0; g1gg are parameters to be estimated. Note that although we include
the product operator over period ts in the likelihood function, if we observe consumer i for only
once in our data, the product over periods becomes moot.
Naturally, the full posterior distribution of the model will be the product of Li across individuals
as well as the prior distributions of parameters, i.e.,
p(
cjdata) =
Y
i
Li(yijt; itj
c)  p(
c) (A23)
With the established new posterior distribution, rms can impute the consumer model using
disaggregate data and adjust their download expectations accordingly. In this manner a new
prediction of d(k;Xtj ; 
c) can be constructed similar to equation 13 using these new estimates.
This prediction is then used in the advertisers bidding game to calculate new equilibrium advertiser
returns.
By comparing the predicted advertiser and platform prots under complete and incomplete
information, we can impute the value of that information and help to determine how the search
engine should price this information.
Further, advertisers are heterogeneous in their valuations about the keyword auction. Through
the policy simulation, we will also be able to observe how the information revelation impacts
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di¤erently on these heterogeneous advertisers. In particular, the questions we may be able to
answer include:
 How does the information revelation change the auction market structure in terms whether
we still have only a few bidders dominate the auctions?
 How does the information revelation change the total returns among advertisers? The answer
to this question gives us insights about how information should be valued for the whole auction
market.
 How does the information revelation impact the revenue of the search engine?
C.2 Policy Simulation II: Segmentation and Targeting
Neither the search engine and advertisers actually observes the segment memberships of consumers
to help with targeting. However, it is possible for the advertiser to infer the posterior probability
of consumer is segment membership conditional on its choices. These estimates can then be used
to improve the accuracy and e¤ectiveness of targeting.
More specically, suppose the search engine observes consumer i in several periods. Let us
consider consumer is binary choices over downloading, sorting/ltering and searching in those
periods. Denote these observations as Hi(fyijtgj;t; fitgt; fsearchitgt). The likelihood of observing
Hi(fyijtgj;t; fitgt; fsearchitgt) is
L(Hi(fyijtgj;t; fitgt; fsearchitgt)) (A24)
=
X
g
Y
t
L(Hi(fyijtgj ; fitgt; fsearchitgt)jgit)  pggit
where
L(Hi(fyijtgj;t; fitgt; fsearchitgt)jgit) (A25)
=
Y
j
Z
ugijt
Z
zgit
(yijtjugijt; git; git)(gitjzgit; git)dugijtdzgit Pr(searchgit)
Hence the posterior probability of segment membership for consumer i can be updated in a Bayesian
fashion,
Pr(i 2 gjHi(fyijtgj;t; fitgt; fsearchitg)) (A26)
=
Q
t L(Hi(fyijtgj ; fitgt; fsearchitg)jgit)  pggitP
g0
Q
t L(Hi(fyijtgj ; fitgt; fsearchitg)jg0it)  pgg
0
it
When consumer i returns to the search engine, the engine will have a more accurate evaluation
about the segment membership of that consumer.
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On the other hand, suppose some consumers only visit the engine once. Before they make
the product choices, the search engine cannot obtain a posterior distribution outlined in Equation
A26 since their choices of products are still unavailable. Still, it is possible to establish a more
informative prediction about their memberships based on their its before their product choices.
Similar to Equation A26, the posterior in this case is
Pr(i 2 gjHi(it)) = L(Hi(it)jgit)  pg
g
itP
g0 L(Hi(it)jg0it)  pgg
0
it
(A27)
where
L(Hi(it)jgit) =
Z
zgit
(gitjzgit; git)dzgit
We can construct an analysis to consider the benets of targeting as follows. First, we compute
the return to advertisers when advertisers can only bid on key words for all segments. Second, we
compute the return accruing to advertisers when they can bid for key words at the segment level.
The di¤erence between the two returns can be considered as a measure for the benets of targeting.
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